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BASIC FREE SPEECH ANALYSIS
Russell W. Galloway*
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment protects freedom of expression, a
composite constitutional right that includes freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, the right to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, and the implied free-
doms of expressive and private association.' Free speech2 is
the matrix of all other freedoms, because it is indispensable to
an informed citizenry, the foundation of democratic govern-
ment. Free speech is also fundamental because it aids the dis-
covery of truth and is a prerequisite to individual
self-realization.
But how does free speech work? This article describes the
basic structure of free speech analysis. The purpose is to help
law students, lawyers, and judges understand and apply the
diverse strands of Supreme Court law in this complex and
important constitutional field.'
* Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia
University School of Law; Director, Supreme Court History Project; member of
the California bar.
1. The first amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. Although the text refers only to Congress, the Supreme Court
has held that the amendment applies to all branches of the federal government
and to state and local governments as well. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) (holding that free speech is a fundamental right made applicable to
the States by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
2. This article uses the term "free speech" as a synonym for "freedom of
expression."
3. Free speech is an exceptionally complicated field of law. A full exposition
of all details and refinements would fill several volumes and is beyond the scope
of this introductory article. The discussion covers most major free speech issues in
the constitutional law curriculum of law schools, but cuts off, perhaps rather
arbitrarily, at certain points, leaving other details and topics out. For example,
special rules concerning freedom of the press are not covered. The reader should
consult standard sources for more information on the omitted issues.
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The legal analysis developed by the Supreme Court in its
effort to enforce free speech may be summarized as follows:
Free Speech: Basic Analysis
I. Preliminary questions
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits: Did respondent violate claimant's
free speech interests?
A. Applicability: Did respondent infringe protected
speech?
1. Protected speech: Does the case involve a
communicative interest protected by the first
amendment?
a. General Rule: All communication and
association for purposes of communication are
protected.
b. Exceptions: The following kinds of
communication are not protected.
1) Criminal speech
2) Fighting words
3) Obscenity
4) Child pornography
5) Commercial speech that is misleading or
concerned solely with illegal activity
2. Infringement: Did respondent substantially
interfere with claimant's free speech?
B. Compliance: Can respondent satisfy the rules
developed by the Supreme Court for enforcing free
speech?
1. Infringements subject to means-end scrutiny
a. Infringements subject to strict scrutiny
1) Content-based infringements
2) Infringements of freedom of association
3) Prior restraints
b. Infringements subject to mid-level scrutiny
1) Content-neutral time, place, 'and manner
regulations
2) Content-neutral regulations of speech plus
conduct (including symbolic speech)
3) Regulations of commercial speech
[Vol. 31
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4) Regulations that restrict communications
by electronic media
5) Regulations of prisoners' outgoing personal
communications
c. Infringements subject to rationality
review
1) Regulations of speech in government
owned or controlled nonpublic forums
2) Regulations of prisoners' incoming
communications
3) Regulations of disfavored speech
4) Regulations that enhance communications
by electronic media
2. Infringements subject to other tests
a. Speech subject to incitement/clear and present
danger tests
b. Defamation
c. Speech by government employees
III. Remedies
Let us translate this outline into prose. A claimant seeking
redress for an alleged violation of free speech must initially
meet three preliminary requirements.' First, the court must
have jurisdiction over the claim. Second, the claim must be
justiciable. Third, the conduct giving rise to the claim must be
government action. Failure to satisfy any of these requirements
normally results in dismissal without reaching the merits of the
free speech claim.
If claimant satisfies the preliminary requirements, the
court will proceed to the merits of the free speech claim. On
the merits, the analysis has two components.5 First, one must
determine whether the first amendment is applicable, i.e.,
4. These are standard preliminary requirements that apply throughout consti-
tutional law.
5. The two-part structure of the analysis is the same for all constitutional
limits. See Galloway, Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 775
(1988). In applying any constitutional restriction on government action, one should
ask first whether the limit is applicable-i.e., is this the kind of government action
that is subject to this limit?-and second whether respondent complied with the
rules the Supreme Court has developed for enforcing the limit. In short, the
analysis on the merits of any constitutional limit focuses on two questions:
(1) applicability and (2) compliance.
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whether respondent infringed claimant's protected speech. In
general, all communication and association for purposes of
communication are protected by the first amendment. There
are exceptions, however. The following kinds of communica-
tion are "outside the first amendment," i.e., not protected by
free speech: criminal speech, fighting words, obscenity, child
pornography, and commercial speech that is misleading or
concerned solely with illegal activity. Government action in-
fringing these kinds of speech is subject to substantive due
process rationality review.
If protected speech is present, the next question is wheth-
er respondent "infringed" claimant's free speech, that is,
whether respondent substantially interfered with the exercise
of claimant's right to communicate or associate. If respondent
did not infringe claimant's protected free speech interests, the
analysis ends.
Second, if respondent did infringe claimant's free speech,
one must determine whether respondent complied with the
rules the Supreme Court has developed for enforcing that
freedom. These rules often take the form of means-end scruti-
ny, a mode of legal analysis that focuses on the government
interests (ends), the effectiveness of the method (means) cho-
sen to further those interests, and the availability of less restric-
tive alternative means. Some infringements, including most
content-based infringements, are subject to strict scrutiny.
Some, including most content-neutral infringements, are sub-
ject to mid-level means-end scrutiny. Some are subject to ratio-
nality review. Others are subject to specialized tests such as the
clear and present danger test used for incitement of illegal acts
and the actual malice test used in public defamation cases.
If the first amendment is inapplicable or its requirements
are met, the analysis ends. If, on the other hand, the first
amendment is applicable and its requirements are not met,
one must proceed to the question of remedies, i.e., what or-
ders the court may issue to redress respondent's violation of
claimant's constitutional rights.
The next section discusses each step of basic free speech
analysis in more detail.
[Vol. 31
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminay Questions
Before reaching the merits, free speech claimants must
satisfy the three standard preliminary requirements that apply
throughout constitutional law, i.e., they must show that the
government harmed them enough to create a justiciable claim
that is within the jurisdiction of the court.
1. Does the court have jurisdiction?
Claimant must show that the court has jurisdiction over
the claim.6 In general, jurisdictional questions are statutory
rather than constitutional7 and therefore beyond the scope of
this article.' Constitutional issues concerning jurisdiction can
arise in the free speech context, as when Congress tries to
repeal the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over free speech cases.
This article will assume that jurisdiction is present in all rele-
vant cases.
2. Is the claim justiciable?
To qualify for a decision on the merits, the claim must in-
volve a justiciable controversy between adverse parties.9 Justi-
ciability problems surface repeatedly in free speech cases. This
article will not provide a detailed analysis ofjusticiability issues,
but a few comments are in order.
6. Jurisdiction is the court's power to hear and decide the case.
7. Although the categories of federal jurisdiction are defined in the Constitu-
tion, U.S. CONST. art.. III, § 2, Congress has authority to regulate that jurisdiction,
and it has exercised that authority by enacting many jurisdictional statutes. The
Court has held that all jurisdiction not conferred by statute has been repealed by
implication. E.g., Ex Palte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Durousseau v.
United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810). Thus, most issues in this field are
statutory.
8. Free speech cases discussing statutory jurisdictional issues include: Fort
Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989) (final judgment rule); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (final judgment rule); Board of Directors v. Rotary
Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2));
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (jurisdiction
over appeals from Puerto Rico under 28 U.S.C. § 1258(2)).
9. See Galloway, Basic Justiciability Analysis, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 911
(1990). A recent decision dismissing a free speech claim on several justiciability
grounds is Renne v. Geary, III S. Ct. 2331 (1991).
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First, claimant must present a "case or controversy""°
that involves an actual dispute between adverse parties. Courts
will not decide free speech issues that are hypothetical. Nor
will courts issue advisory opinions on free speech claims, in-
cluding opinions in cases decided on independent and ade-
quate state grounds.
1
Second, the free speech claim must be ripe.12 It must not
be moot.' And courts will not decide the claim unless a con-
stitutional ruling is necessary. Consequently, courts should, if
possible, adopt saving interpretations of statutes to avoid de-
ciding free speech issues.'
4
Third, claimant must have standing to assert the free
speech claim. 5 This involves two constitutional requirements.
Claimant must show injury in fact,' 6 i.e., a distinct and palpa-
ble injury.' 7  Claimant must also demonstrate that
respondent's conduct caused the injury and that the relief
requested will redress the injury.'8
To have standing, claimant must also contend with two
"prudential requirements."" Claimant must assert something
more than a "generalized grievance" shared by all or most
members of the general population.0 Usually, claimant must
assert his/her own rights; vicarious standing is not allowed.2'
But there are exceptions. 2
2
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
11. E.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2702 n.5 (1990)
(lower court's decision held not to rest on independent state grounds).
12. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-18 (1976).
13. E.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989) (plurality opinion) (case
vacated as moot because statute at issue had been repealed); Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1986) (case not moot because capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596 (1982)).
14. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988) (interpreting residential
picketing ordinance to ban only picketing focused on particular residence); Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1957) (interpreting Smith Act narrowly to
avoid free speech issues).
15. E.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596, 607-09 (1990).
16. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
17. Id.
18. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975).
19. Id. at 498.
20. Id. at 499.
21. Id.
22. E.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988)
[Vol. 31888
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A special first amendment exception to the rule against
vicarious standing is the "overbreadth" doctrine, i.e., the rule
that free speech and free association claimants challenging a
substantially overbroad statute are permitted to assert the
rights of third parties not before the court.23 If a statute could
constitutionally be applied to claimant but the language of the
statute is capable of being applied unconstitutionally to a sub-
stantial number of others, a free speech claimant may assert
the rights of those other persons and have the statute struck
down on its face.24
The reason for allowing third-party standing in this con-
text is that overbroad statutes may chill free speech by third
parties who are not willing to risk prosecution. Challenges by
persons whose activities are not protected are needed to elimi-
nate the statutes' chilling effects on persons whose activities
are protected.25
3. Was the harm caused by government action?
The first amendment, like most other constitutional limits,
applies only to the government. 26 Conduct undertaken by a
person acting in a purely private capacity need not comply
with the first amendment.
Government-action issues fall into three classes. First, if
the challenged conduct was undertaken by a government offi-
cial, the government action requirement is met unless the con-
duct was unrelated to the official's government duties.27 Sec-
ond, if the challenged conduct was undertaken jointly by a
government official and a private party, the government-action
(holding that the NYSCA has standing to assert rights of member clubs because
member clubs have standing, member clubs' interests are germane to NYSCA's
purpose, and relief does not require presence of member clubs).
23. A statute is substantially overbroad if its impermissible applications are
'not only 'real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep.'" Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1697 (1990) (quoting
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
24. E.g., Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697; Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576,
581 (1989); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972).
25. E.g., Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1699 n. 12.
26. See Galloway, The Government-Action Requirement in American Constitutional
Law, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 935 (1990). The amendment applies to all branches
of federal, state, and local government. See supra note 1.
27. E.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
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requirement is probably met, although the scope of this rule is
not clear.28 Third, if the conduct was undertaken by a private
party not acting jointly with a government official, the govern-
ment action requirement is not met unless the conduct is a
"public function," i.e., a function "traditionally exclusively re-
served" to the government,29 or the government either com-
pelled the conduct or encouraged it so substantially that the
decision to undertake the conduct must be attributed to the
government.
30
If claimant does not satisfy the three preliminary require-
ments, the claim should be dismissed without reaching the
merits of the free speech issues. If claimant satisfies the prelim-
inary requirements, one may proceed to evaluate the free
speech claim on the merits.
B. On the Merits: Did Respondent Violate Claimant's Free Speech
Rights?
Analysis of free speech claims on the merits involves the
same two-step inquiry that applies to all constitutional lim-
its.3 1 One must determine initially whether the first amend-
ment is applicable, i.e., whether the government action that
28. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
29. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). Accord
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978). In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946), the Court held that administration of a company town is a public
function and that the first amendment bars the corporate owner from prohibiting
distribution of religious literature in the town. On the other hand, private owners
of shopping centers may ban labor picketing, because running a private shopping
center is not a public function. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (over-
ruling Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968)). To date, the only other public function recognized by the Supreme Court
is running an election. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The Court appar-
ently intends to keep the public function doctrine within "its present carefully
confined bounds." Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163.
30. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("[C]onstitutional
standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the
specific conduct of which plaintiff complains . . . . [A] State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or
has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."). A symbiotic relationship
between the government and the private party in which the government profits
from the private conduct may also satisfy the government-action requirement,
although the status of this rule is in doubt. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-26 (1961).
31. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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harmed claimant was the kind of government action that is
subject to the first amendment. If so, one must determine
whether respondent complied with first amendment require-
ments.
1. Applicability: Did respondent infringe claimant's protected
free speech interests?
Free speech analysis applies only to government action
that infringes a communicative interest protected by the first
amendment. Thus, when one reaches the merits of free speech
claims, the threshold questions are (1) whether the case in-
volves a communicative interest protected by the first amend-
ment and, if so, (2) whether the challenged government action
infringed that interest. Claimant has the burden of proof on
both these threshold requirements. The ensuing sections dis-
cuss the protected interest and infringement requirements.
a. Communication protected by first amendment?
First, claimant must prove that the case involves a commu-
nicative interest protected by the first amendment. As a gener-
al rule, the first amendment protects all types of communica-
tion and association for purposes of communication. On the
other hand, the Court has recognized some exceptions to this
general rule, i.e., some kinds of communication that are "out-
side the first amendment." The next two sections discuss the
general rule and the exceptions.
1) General rule: communications are protected by the
first amendment
The first threshold question is whether the case implicates
a communicative interest protected by the first amendment.
The first amendment explicitly bans abridging "the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right.., to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 2 More-
over, the Court has held that the amendment implicitly pro-
tects the right not to communicate or associate, 3 freedom of
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. "[IT]he First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term neces-
sarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say." Riley v.
1991]
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thought and mind, 4 and freedom of expressive and private
association."
The Supreme Court has interpreted these rights broadly
to cover most forms of communication. For purposes of orga-
nizing first amendment analysis, one may start with the general
rule that communication is protected by the first amend-
ment. 6 Unless an exception is applicable, one should assume
that claimant's communications are protected.
Applying this general rule, the Supreme Court has held
that many types of communicative and associative activity are
protected by the first amendment.3 7 Political speech is at the
core of the first amendment.3" Scientific, literary, and artistic
communications are covered. 9 Movies, music, dancing, and
other forms of entertainment are protected.4" So is charitable
National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 790 (1988). Cf Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (right not to associate); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977) (right not to display motto "Live Free or Die" on license plate).
34. E.g., Riley, 487 U.S. at 791 ("the broader concept of 'individual freedom
of mind'").
35. E.g., Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (private
association); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (expressive association). This
article will frequently use the word "communication" broadly to cover expressive
and private association.
36. The first amendment protects both the speaker's right to make the communi-
cation and the audience's right to receive it. E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976) ("If there is a
right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising . .. .);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969).
37. A typical, broad statement of first amendment coverage is the following
from Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981): "Entertainment,
as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and
dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee."
38. E.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1401
(1990) ("the right to engage in political expression is fundamental to our constitu-
tional system"); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.
214, 223 (1989) (listing cases); Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829 (1978) (criticism of judges); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (campaign
expenditures and contributions); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)
("[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.").
39. Cf Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that even patently
offensive material appealing to the prurient interest in sex is protected by the first
amendment if it has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
40. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (music);
Schad v. Borough of Mi. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (live entertainment); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (movies).
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solicitation,4 the right of the media to gather news,4 2 and
the right of a group to boycott businesses in order to pursue
civil rights concerns.4" This list is not exhaustive; it merely
illustrates the broad scope of protected communicative inter-
ests. In short, most verbal communications are protected,44
and nonverbal conduct undertaken for purposes of communi-
cation is often protected as well. 5
2) Exceptions: communications not protected by the
first amendment
Exceptions do exist. The Court has held that some com-
munications are outside the first amendment. If, in a particular
case, the government action affects only such unprotected ex-
pression, the first amendment is not applicable and no first
amendment violation is possible. In such cases, the govern-
ment may usually impose regulations, including prohibitions of
the unprotected speech, if the regulations satisfy substantive
due process rationality review. Respondent prevails in such
cases unless claimant proves that (1) the government has no
conceivable, valid interest in regulating the speech or (2) if a
valid government interest does exist, the regulation is not even
arguably an effective means to further the interest. 46
The kinds of speech not protected by the first amendment
include: criminal speech, fighting words, obscenity, child por-
nography, and commercial speech that is misleading or solely
concerned with illegal activity.47 The ensuing sections will dis-
41. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3118 (1990); Riley v. National
Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 788-89 (1988); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens
for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 629 (1980). "[C]haritable appeals for funds, on
the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests-communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the
advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of the First Amendment." Village
of Schaumbui, 444 U.S. at 632.
42. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
43. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
44. The emotive as well as cognitive aspects of communications are protected.
E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
45. E.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); O'Brien v. United
States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
46. E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
47. Profanity and commercial speech were once thought to be outside the
first amendment, but those views have changed. See infra notes 180-81, 351 and
accompanying text. It is possible to argue that defamation and incitement creating
1991]
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cuss each of these categories of unprotected speech separately
and then describe the methodology the Court may use in the
future to create new exceptions.
a) Criminal speech
Purely criminal speech is not protected by the first amend-
ment.48 Thus, perjury may be punished, as well as words used
in soliciting crime, abetting crime, and conspiring to commit
crime.49 Restrictions on such unprotected criminal speech are
subject to rationality review.
This important category of unprotected speech has re-
ceived surprisingly little discussion by the Supreme Court.
Indeed, there is no settled test for defining criminal speech.
Clearly, if the sole purpose of the speech is to further a crime,
the speech is unprotected. Whether the criminal speech excep-
tion extends to speech having a primary criminal purpose and
also secondary noncriminal purposes is unsettled.5"
b) Fighting words
Fighting words are not protected by the first amend-
ment.5 Fighting words are "words that 'have a direct tenden-
a clear and present danger of illegal acts are also outside the first amendment.
The better view, however, is that defamation and most incitement of illegal acts
are protected by the first amendment but they may be punished if the applicable
tests ("actual malice," "clear and present danger," etc.) are satisfied. See infra notes
445-46 and accompanying text.
48. E.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) ("It
rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press
extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute. We reject the contention now."); Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) ("counselling of a murder"). See
Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645.
49. E.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 994 (1991) ("bribery, perjury,
and counseling murder are widely considered unprotected by the First Amend-
ment.").
50. If the purpose to further a crime is accompanied by a primary expressive
purpose such as political protest, the criminal speech exception does not apply,
and the Court usually applies the incitement/clear and present danger test. See
infra notes 447-79 and accompanying text.
51. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), is the seminal case
that created the fighting words exception. Other cases discussing the fighting
words doctrine include Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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cy to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individual-
ly, the remark is addressed."'52
This test includes several components that need to be ana-
lyzed separately. First, the fighting words doctrine is limited to
individualized, face-to-face communications; language directed
at a crowd will not suffice.5 Second, the words must "tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace."54 Third, the test
focuses on whether a reasonable person in the speaker's shoes
would have known the words were likely to produce an imme-
diate violent response.55 Fourth, the test focuses on the likely
response of the "average person,"56 but it may also take into
account any special characteristics of the addressee that affect
the seriousness of the insult or the likelihood of violent re-
sponse, at least if those characteristics are known by the speak-
er.
57
Imposition of criminal sanctions on a speaker for uttering
fighting words usually does not violate the first amendment,
but the statute must be narrowly drafted to reflect all compo-
nents of the fighting words test. If the statute is not so limited,
it will be void on its face for overbreadth and completely unen-
forceable.5"
c) Obscenity
Obscene communications are not protected by the first
amendment. 5g Material is obscene if (1) taken as a whole, it
52. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573).
53. Gooding 405 U.S. at 524 ("the person to whom, individually, the remark
is addressed"); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 ("directed at some particular person").
54. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 574 ("likely to provoke the average person to retaliation").
57. In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972), for example,
Justice Powell indicated that insults directed at police officers are less likely to
cause a violent response, because police officers are "trained to exercise a higher
degree of restraint than the average citizen." Id. at 913 (Powell, J., concurring).
Similarly, an ethnic slur is more likely to cause violence when directed at a mem-
ber of the group that is the object of the slur.
58. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972). The overbreadth doctrine is rather strictly applied in this
area, because "the Court does not look with favor on prosecutions for 'fighting
words.'" J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 946 (1986).
Accord L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 850 & n.5 (1988).
59. E.g., Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1990)
("the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech");
1991]
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appeals to the average person's prurient interest, that is,
shameful or morbid interest in sex, 6° (2) it depicts or de-
scribes, in a patently offensive way, ultimate sexual acts (nor-
mal or perverted), masturbation, excretory functions, lewd
exhibition of the genitals, or similar "hard core" sexual con-
duct explicitly defined and banned by applicable law, and (3)
taken as a whole, it does not have serious literary, artistic, po-
litical, or scientific value.6' Contemporary community stan-
dards are used to determine whether the material appeals to
the prurient interest and is patently offensive, and the govern-
ment may adopt national, state, or local community standards
for making these determinations62 or omit geographical refer-
ences altogether and leave it to the jury to define the geo-
graphic community.63 Whether material is obscene under the
three-part Miller test is a question of fact for the jury,64 but
reviewing judges are required to conduct an independent re-
view and reverse if they find the material not obscene.65
The key question in most obscenity cases is whether the
communication is obscene. If so, the first amendment does not
apply, and the government normally wins, because the easy-to-
satisfy substantive due process rational basis test controls. If
not, the government normally loses, because it cannot satisfy
the strict scrutiny test applicable to most content-based in-
fringements.66 Since careful application of the three-part Mill-
er test is crucial and since the test is complex and highly partic-
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically
settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.").
60. The word "obscene" is sometimes used colloquially to describe shocking
violence, profanity, blasphemy, etc. The legal definition, however, is limited to
materials dealing with sex.
61. Mille, 413 U.S. at 24. Written and oral, as well as pictorial expression
may be obscene. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
62. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Millet; 413 U.S. at 30-34.
63. E.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
64. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973). The jury may consider "pandering," i.e., efforts by the distributor to
stress the material's sexual content, as evidence that the material is obscene.
Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966).
65. Jenkins v. Geoigia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
66. See infra notes 135-207 and accompanying text.
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ularized, further discussion of the three components is present-
ed in the next three subsections.
(1) Prurient interest
Obscenity is limited to materials that "taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest in sex" of the average person in
light of contemporary community standards.67 This require-
ment involves several elements that should be analyzed sepa-
rately. First, the test focuses on the material as a whole rather
than any isolated segment of the material.6" At one time, the
Court required that "the dominant theme of the material tak-
en as a whole appeals to prurient interest."69 The "dominant
theme" requirement was rejected in Miller, however, and the
current test requires only that the material as a whole appeal
to the prurient interest. Second, "prurient interest" means
"shameful or morbid interest in sex."7° Appeal to the
audience's normal, healthy interest in sex is not enough to
make the material obscene. Third, the test requires the trier of
fact to apply "contemporary community standards" and deter-
mine whether the material appeals to the prurient interest of
the "average person."7 Lawmakers may choose the geograph-
ical area (nation, state, county, city, etc.) that will be used to
define contemporary community standards.72
(2) Patent offensiveness
Obscenity is limited to materials that "portray sexual con-
duct in a patently offensive way." 3 This component also con-
67. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
68. The traditional obscenity test, derived from Regina v. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. 360
(1868), allowed punishment if any isolated passage in the material appealed to the
prurient interest. This approach was rejected in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
69. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
70. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
71. Millet,; 413 U.S. at 24. If the material is targeted at a particular audience,
such as gay men, the test focuses on the average member of that audience.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The traditional Hicklin test allowed
punishment if the material appealed to the prurient interest of the most suscepti-
ble consumer, but Roth rejected this rule.
72. At one time it appeared that the Constitution required application of
national community standards, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966),
but Miller rejected this requirement.
73. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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tains several elements that should be considered separately.
First, the material must be "hard core" pornography,7 4 i.e., it
must depict or describe hard core sex acts such as ultimate sex
acts, masturbation, excretion, or lewd exhibition of the geni-
tals.75 Second, the sexual conduct must be "specifically de-
fined by the applicable ... law."7" In other words, unless the
sexual conduct is listed in the statute or court opinions, its
depiction or description may not be punished. Third, the com-
munication must be patently offensive according to contempo-
rary community standards.77
(3) Absence of serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value
Obscenity is limited to materials which "taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific val-
ue." a7 This component also involves several separate ele-
ments. First, like the prurient interest test, this test focuses on
the material as a whole rather than on isolated passages. Sec-
ond, the question is whether a "reasonable person" would find
that the material has serious value; the contemporary commu-
nity standards approach used to determine prurient interest
and patent offensiveness is not applicable here.79 Third, the
test is whether the material lacks "serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value."' Earlier cases held that material is
not obscene unless it is "utterly without redeeming social val-
ue,"8' but this stricter requirement was rejected in Miller.
Since obscenity is outside the first amendment, the gov-
ernment may regulate its distribution and use in places of
public accommodation if the substantive due process rational
basis test is met, i.e., if a reasonable person could conclude
74. Id. at 27.
75. Id. at 25.
76. Id. at 24.
77. The contemporary community standards requirement is the same as in
the prurient interest component of the obscenity test.
78. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
79. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). "The proper inquiry is not whether
an ordinary member of any given community would find serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable
person would find such value in the material, taken as a whole." Id. at 500-01.
80. Millet; 413 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
81. E.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966).
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that the regulation arguably advances any conceivable valid
government interest.82 The Court has repeatedly held that
regulation of obscenity does arguably serve legitimate govern-
ment interests."s Therefore, the government may ban the pub-
lic exhibition of obscene films to consenting adults,8 4 importa-
tion of obscenity,85 mailing of obscenity even to adults who
solicit it,86 and interstate transportation of obscene materi-
als.87 On the other hand, the government may not ban pri-
vate possession and use of obscenity.88
(4) Other requirements
Government restrictions on obscenity may apply only to
material which satisfies the Miller test. In addition, the Consti-
tution imposes other safeguards to insure that any incidental
chilling effect on protected expression is minimized. For exam-
ple, distributors may not be punished for obscenity unless the
government proves scienter, i.e., knowledge of the contents of
the obscene material.80 Moreover, licensing systems are per-
mitted only if (1) the government has the burden of proving
obscenity, (2) obscenity is determined by a court after an ad-
versary hearing, and (3) a prompt, final, judicial decision is as-
sured.90
82. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); United States v.
Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
83. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The governmental interests
served include the interests in quality of life, community environment, tone of
commerce, and public safety.
84. Id.
85. United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (importation
for private use); United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (importa-
tion for commercial use).
86. Reidel, 402 U.S. at 351.
87. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
88. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
89. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
90. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). The three requirements are
often referred to as the Freedman standards, and are applicable to some licensing
systems in fields other than obscenity as well. See infra notes 278-81 and accompa-
nying text.
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d) Child pornography
Child pornography is not protected by the first amend-
ment.9 Material is child pornography if it visually depicts chil-
dren engaging in sexual 'activities. 2 Its production, distribu-
tion, and/or possession may be punished if the prohibited
conduct, including the kinds of sexual conduct and the age of
the children, is adequately defined by law, and if scienter is
required."
The key question in child pornography cases is whether
the material is child pornography. If so, the first amendment
does not apply, and the government normally wins, because
the easy-to-satisfy substantive due process rational basis test
controls. If not, the government normally loses, because it can-
not satisfy the strict scrutiny test applicable to content-based in-
fringements. The ensuing sections describe the components of
the three-part Ferber test in more detail.
(1) Visual depiction of child sex
Material is not child pornography unless it contains pic-
tures of actual children having sex. 4 Thus, writings describ-
ing child sex are not child pornography. Similarly, imaginary
drawings of children having sex are not child pornography.
The evil that justifies putting child pornography outside the
first amendment is sexual exploitation of real children, and
any statutory ban must be limited to actual or photographically
recorded child sex.
91. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). "Today, we hold that child
pornography ... is unprotected speech .... " Id. at 766. Since "the evil...
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests . . . it is permissible to consider
materials as without the protection of the First Amendment." Id. at 763-64. Ferber
is an outstanding example of definitional balancing, the standard analysis the
Court uses to determine whether categories of speech are outside the first amend-
ment. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
definitional balancing.
92. New York v. Ferbei; 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
93. Id. Ferber upheld a statutory ban on distribution of child pornography.
Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990), upheld a statutory ban on private
possession of child pornography.
94. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
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(2) Prohibited conduct adequately defined
Possession and distribution of child pornography may not
be banned unless the prohibited conduct is adequately defined
by law.95 The definition must specify the age of the children
and the kinds of sexual conduct subject to sanction.
(3) Scienter
Finally, punishment for possession or distribution of child
pornography is unconstitutional unless the government proves
scienter, that is, that claimant knew the material included pic-
tures of child sex.
96
e) Commercial speech that is misleading or
solely concerned with illegal activity
Commercial speech is subject to a two-track first amend-
ment analysis. Commercial speech that is misleading or solely
concerned with illegal activity is outside the first amend-
ment.97 Such speech may be regulated subject only to sub-
stantive due process rationality review. Other commercial
speech is subject to a mid-level version of means-end scrutiny.
This section will discuss only unprotected commercial
speech.98
(1) Commercial speech?
The threshold question is whether claimant's speech was
"commercial speech." The Court has used three tests to answer
this question. First, "speech which does 'no more than propose
a commercial transaction' is commercial speech.99 Second,
95. Id. at 764; cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (imposing
similar requirement for obscenity).
96. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982); cf. Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959) (imposing similar scienter requirement for obscenity).
97. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980).
98. See infra notes 351-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
related topic of commercial speech that is not misleading or solely concerned with
illegal activity and hence is protected by the first amendment.
99. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976)).
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speech that proposes a commercial transaction and also pres-
ents other protected communications is commercial speech if
the commercial proposal is not "inextricably intertwined" with
noncommercial speech.' Third, speech that proposes a
commercial transaction and also presents other protected com-
munications has been held to be commercial speech if it (1) is
an advertisement; (2) refers to a specific product; and (3) is
motivated by economic gain.'0 '
(2) Misleading or solely concerned with
illegal activity?
If the communications are commercial speech, the Central
Hudson test controls, 0 2 and the next question is whether the
speech is misleading or concerned solely with illegal activity. If
so, the commercial speech is unprotected by the first amend-
ment. 1
03
Commercial speech is "misleading" for purposes of this
test if it is false, it actually misled someone, or there is a "sig-
nificant possibility" that it will mislead the audience.10 4 For
100. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989).
101. Bolget; 463 U.S. at 66-67. It is unclear whether the Fox test supersedes the
Bolger test for mixed commercial and noncommercial speech or whether the two
will coexist. Fox suggests that the former is correct. Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court twice suggests that, unless the speech is inextricably intertwined with non-
commercial speech, the test for determining whether speech is commercial is
simply whether it proposes a commercial transaction. Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74
("[T]he AFS 'Tupperware' parties ... 'propose a commercial transaction,'...
which is the test for identifying commercial speech."); id. at 482 ("speech that
proposes a commercial transaction, which is what defines commercial speech")
(emphasis in original).
102. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980). Central Hudson is the leading case in which the modern commercial
speech test emerged. The Central Hudson test has four parts: (1) is the speech
concerned with lawful activity and not misleading; (2) does the government have a
"substantial interest" in restricting the speech; (3) does the challenged government
action "directly advance" that interest; and (4) is the government action "necessary
to serve that interest?" The first part of the Central Hudson test is the "switching
question" that determines whether "track one" or "track two" of commercial
speech analysis should be used. If the commercial speech is misleading or solely
concerned with illegal activity, rationality review is used. If not, the mid-level
means-end scrutiny required by parts 24 of the Central Hudson test should be
used.
103. Id. at 563-64, 566.
104. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979). The Court often uses the
term "inherently misleading" to describe commercial speech that meets the "signifi-
cant possibility" test. E.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
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example, trade names may be regulated, because they may mis-
lead the public by creating the false impression of continuity
and competition." 5 Similarly, in-person solicitation of legal
business may be regulated because of the danger that lawyers
trained in the art of persuasion will mislead or coerce potential
clients.
1 6
f) Method for determining whether new excep-
tions should be created
To determine whether particular categories of speech
should be excluded from first amendment protection, the
Court uses a definitional balancing test that involves weighing
the government's interest in suppressing the speech against the
harm to first amendment interests.' 7 In evaluating the
government's interest, courts should consider: (1) the strength
of the government's interest; (2) the effectiveness of the regula-
tion in furthering that interest; and (3) the availability of less
onerous alternatives.10 8  In evaluating the harm to first
amendment interests, courts should consider the extent to
which the speech contributes to values protected by the first
amendment. If the government's interest is compelling and the
harm to free speech interests is de minimis, the entire category
of speech is outside the first amendment.'0 9 If the govern-
105. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 15.
106. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
107. Definitional balancing, in contrast to ad-hoc balancing, gives rise to a rule
*(definition) to be applied in future cases.
108. These are the same factors the Court evaluates in applying intensified
means-end scrutiny, but the method of analysis is different. For example, when
strict means-end scrutiny is applicable, respondent must prove separately that there
is a compelling governmental interest, that the means are effective, and that no
less onerous alternatives exist. In contrast, when the balancing test is applicable,
the Court merely weighs each factor as one component in the overall balance. In
such cases, the factors are not separate prerequisites and respondent need not
prove each separately.
109. As Justice Brennan put it in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 776
(1982) (Brennan, J., concurring): "[Tihe limited classes of speech, the suppression
of which does not raise serious First Amendment concerns have two attributes:
they are of exceedingly slight social value, and the state has a compelling interest
in their regulation." Tihe majority agreed, stating:
[I]t is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been
accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the
confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so over-
whelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no
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ment interest is not compelling or the harm to free speech
interests is significant, the category of speech is protected by
the first amendment.
Perhaps the best illustration of this balancing test is New
York v. Ferber,"' the landmark case holding child pornogra-
phy to be outside the first amendment. In evaluating the
government's need to ban child pornography, the Court
stressed that the interest in preventing sexual exploitation of
children is compelling, that punishing distribution is an effec-
tive means for furthering that interest, and that banning distri-
bution is the only effective alternative, since elimination of the
profit motive is necessary to stop the sexual abuse of children
that occurs during the production of child pornography. In
evaluating the harm to free speech interests, the Court stressed
that such harm is de minimis, since adult actors can be used to
simulate children where child sex is important to the commu-
nicative impact of a work."' Since the government's interest
is compelling and the harm to free speech de minimis, the en-
tire category of child pornography is unprotected by the first
amendment.'12
Let us summarize. As a general rule, the first amendment
protects all communications. This general rule has several ex-
ceptions, however. Criminal speech, fighting words, obscenity,
child pornography, and commercial speech that is misleading
or solely concerned with illegal activity are outside the first
amendment. To determine whether any of these exceptions is
applicable, one must carefully apply the Supreme Court's rules
process of case-by-case adjudication is required.
Ferbei; 458 U.S. at 763-64.
110. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
111. A determined effort to exclude non-obscene pornography from the first
amendment because of its degrading effect on women has apparently failed be-
cause the harm to first amendment interests would be substantial. See American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), af'd, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
112. Other cases in which the Court used the balancing test to determine
whether a category of speech is protected by the first amendment include Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(commercial speech); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public
defamation); and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting
words). As the Court put it in Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572: "[Sluch utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality."
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defining those categories of speech. If an exception is applica-
ble, one should apply rationality review. If no exception ap-
plies, one may use definitional balancing to determine whether
a new exception should be created.
If the speech is protected, one should proceed to the next
first amendment issue, whether respondent infringed
claimant's protected communicative interest.
b. Infringement?
1) Definition
If a communicative interest protected by the first amend-
ment is involved in the case, the next question is whether re-
spondent "infringed" that interest, i.e., whether the challenged
government action had a sufficiently serious adverse effect on
the exercise of the right to justify intensified scrutiny under
the first amendment. If the government action had no adverse
effect or only a de minimis adverse effect on claimant's free
speech, no infringement occurred, and respondent need not
run the gauntlet of first amendment scrutiny. Claimant has the
burden of proof on the issue of infringement.
To determine whether an infringement occurred, one
must evaluate the totality of the circumstances and make a
pragmatic, common sense judgment whether the challenged
government action substantially interfered with claimant's exer-
cise of free speech. One must examine the actual impact of
respondent's action and make a judgment whether that impact
is serious enough to merit intensified first amendment scruti-
ny.113
113. Justice Stewart described the Court's methodology as follows:
[O]n the basis of common sense and available information, we have
asked, often implicitly, (1) whether there was a rational connection
between the cause (the government action) and the effect (the deter-
rence or impairment of First Amendment activity), and (2) whether
the effect would occur with some regularity, i.e., would not be de
minimis . . . . And in making this determination, we have shown a
special solicitude towards the "indispensable liberties" protected by the
First Amendment . . . Once this threshold inquiry has been satis-
fied, we have then examined the competing interests in determining
whether there is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment
freedoms.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 733-34 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Lyng v. UAW" 4 illustrates the Court's general approach
to the infringement issue. In Lyng the Court upheld a statuto-
ry denial of food stamps to families of striking employees, con-
cluding that the denial did not infringe claimants' first amend-
ment rights. An infringement occurs, according to Lyng, if the
government actions "'directly and substantially' interfere" with
protected rights1 5 or comprise "'significant' interference"
with such rights." 6 Applying this definition, the majority con-
cluded that "the statute does not infringe either the
associational or expressive rights of appellees."" T Since "[i]t
is exceedingly unlikely that close relatives would choose to live
apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps... ,
the statute at issue does not "'directly and substantially"
interfere' with appellees' ability to associate."" l8
2) Examples
a) Government action infringing free speech
Infringements of free speech may arise in different ways.
First, respondent may use licensing systems, confiscations, in-
junctions, black lists, and similar procedures to restrain com-
municative activities before they take place. Such "prior re-
straints" are strongly disfavored and are permitted only in ex-
ceptional circumstances or pursuant to special procedural
rules." 9 Second, respondent may impose "subsequent pun-
ishment," i.e., sanctions that take effect after the exercise of
first amendment rights. Typical sanctions include criminal pun-
ishment (imprisonment and fines), 2 1 civil damages
awards, 12 1 and denial of privileges such as government em-
ployment, government contracts, and occupational licens-
es. 122 Third, respondent may impose "incidental" burdens on
free expression while pursuing other valid purposes. 2 Re-
114. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
115. Id. at 365.
116. Id. at 367.
117. Id. at 364.
118. Id. at 365-66 (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)).
119. See infra notes 255-81 and accompanying text.
120. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
121. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
122. E.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (1990) ("condi-
tioning hiring decisions on political beliefis] and association").
123. In cases involving incidental infringements, questions concerning "over-
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porting and disclosure requirements are typical.1 24 This list is
far from exhaustive.
b) Government action not infringing free speech
Many cases have rejected free speech claims because no
"infringement" occurred. For example, requiring a university
to disclose peer review materials relating to tenure decisions
"does not infringe any First Amendment right," 2  because
the injury to academic freedom is "remote and attenuated"
and "speculative." 126 Requiring Rotary Clubs to admit wom-
en members does not infringe freedom of association, because
admitting women increases rather than decreases the men's
opportunity to associate. 127 Requiring certain films to be la-
belled "political propaganda" does not infringe free speech,
because the label is not sufficiently pejorative to interfere sub-
stantially with showing the movies.
128
If the government action that harmed claimant did not in-
fringe a protected communicative interest, the first amend-
ment does not apply and the free speech analysis ends. If, on
the other hand, the challenged government action did infringe
a protected communicative interest, the analysis proceeds to
the question of compliance.
2. Compliance: Can respondent satisfy the rules developed by
the Supreme Court for enforcing free speech?
If respondent infringed claimant's protected communica-
tive interest, the first amendment applies, and the next issue is
breadth" and "vagueness" are often important. In seeking to deter fighting words
and obscenity, for example, a statute that defines these categories of speech in an
overbroad manner so that it applies to protected as well as unprotected speech
infringes free speech, because it may deter people from engaging in protected
communicative activities. E.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Similarly, if
the statute is so vague that reasonable persons would have to guess whether it
applies to protected communications, it chills free speech, raising serious due pro-
cess concerns. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
124. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex re. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
125. University of Pennsylvania v..EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577, 589 (1990).
126. Id. at 588.
127. Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
128. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987). See also Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct.
1759 (1991), holding that federal regulations banning federally funded family
planning clinics from counseling abortion do not infringe firee speech.
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whether respondent can satisfy the tests developed by the Su-
preme Court for enforcing free speech. Here the analysis
reaches a crucial turning point. Different infringements of free
speech trigger different tests, including a variety of levels of
means-end scrutiny and several other tests as well. The lawyer's
task is to examine the infringement, characterize it, and scan
the various strands of first amendment law to determine which
tests are arguably applicable." 9 Is the infringement content-
based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny? Is it a content-
neutral time, place, or manner regulation subject to mid-level
scrutiny? Is the infringement a point-of-view neutral regulation
of speech in a nonpublic forum and therefore subject to ratio-
nality review? And so on.30
The following sections describe the different kinds of in-
fringements of free speech and the tests applicable to each.
The discussion focuses first on infringements subject to means-
end scrutiny,"3 ' the group of tests most commonly used in
free speech cases.' 32
a. Infringements subject to means-end scrutiny
Most infringements of free speech are subject to
means-end scrutiny, a mode of legal analysis that requires the
court to scrutinize (1) the government's purpose or "end," (2)
the effectiveness of the method or "means" chosen to achieve
that purpose, and, usually, (3) the availability of less restrictive
129. This step of the analysis is similar to the characterization step in conflict
of law analysis. There, the lawyer examines the facts, determines whether the
claim is based on tort, contract, or the like, and then applies the choice-of-law
rules for the appropriate body of law. Similarly, in free speech cases, the lawyer
examines the facts, determines what kind of infringement is present, and then
applies the legal test specified by the Supreme Court for that particular kind of
infringement.
130. A particular fact situation may arguably fit into several strands of free
speech law. In such cases, the lawyer should argue the different tests in the
alternative. A helpful tactic is to look at the facts from both claimant's and
respondent's point of view and identify those strands of free speech law most
likely to lead to victory for each side. Obviously claimant will argue that the
strictest tests are applicable, while respondent will prefer the most lenient tests.
131. For a detailed discussion of means-end scrutiny, see Galloway, Means-End
Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 449 (1988).
132. See infra notes 445-548 and accompanying text for a discussion of other
tests used in free speech cases.
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alternatives to achieve the purpose. l33 The Court has identi-
fied several different "levels" or "intensities" of means-end
scrutiny. These levels can be grouped roughly into three cate-
gories: strict scrutiny, mid-level scrutiny, and rationality review.
The next three sections discuss infringements of free speech
governed by these three levels of means-end scrutiny.
1) Infringements subject to strict scrutiny
The most demanding version of means-end scrutiny is
strict scrutiny. The strict-scrutiny test has two parts, the first of
which has two components. Respondent must prove, first, that
the infringement furthers a compelling interest, i.e., that the
infringement was undertaken for a compelling (very impor-
tant) purpose and comprises a substantially effective method
for achieving that purpose. Respondent must prove, second,
that the infringement was necessary, i.e., the least restrictive
alternative available for furthering the interest.' 4 Strict scru-
tiny applies to most content-based infringements of free
speech, infringements of free association, and prior restraints.
a) Content-based infringements
Most content-based infringements of protected speech are
subject to a strong presumption of unconstitutionality and are
not permitted unless the government satisfies strict scrutiny by
proving that the infringement is necessary to further a compel-
ling government interest.' In applying this general rule,
one must determine whether the infringement is content-
based and, if so, whether respondent can satisfy strict scrutiny.
133. See Galloway, supra note 131, at 450-51.
134. For a more detailed discussion of strict scrutiny, see Galloway, supra note
131, at 453-55.
135. E.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). As the
Court put it in Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95: "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." This general rule has numerous
exceptions, which will be discussed later.
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(1) Content-based infringement?
The threshold question is whether the infringement is
content-based.1 3 6 Content-based infringements fall into sever-
al categories. First, infringements directed at claimant's point
of view are content-based.17 Second, infringements directed
at the subject matter of the communication are
content-based.3 8 Third, infringements directed at claimant's
choice of words are content-based.' Fourth, infringements
directed at claimant's identity are content-based. 40 Fifth, in-
fringements directed at the "communicative impact" of
claimant's conduct are content- based.'
41
Facially content-based classifications may be deemed
content-neutral, however, if the government's purpose is "unre-
lated to the content of expression." 4 ' "Government regula-
tion of expressive activity is content-neutral so long as it is 'us-
tiffed without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."' 143 In other words, infringements are content-based
136. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) ("[Tlhe appropriate level
of scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited
and permitted speech on the basis of content."). This is the switching question
that usually controls whether the infringement is subject to a strong or mid-level
presumption of unconstitutionality. If the infringement is content-based, the pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality is usually very strong, and respondent must satisfy
strict scrutiny. If the infringement is content-neutral, a weaker presumption of
unconstitutionality usually applies, and respondent must satisfy only a softer
version of means-end scrutiny. See infra notes 282-350 and accompanying text.
137. E.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 ("[G]overnment may not grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to
express less favored or more controversial views .... [G]overnment must afford
all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.").
138. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537
(1980) ("The First Amendment's hostility to content based regulation extends not
only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discus-
sion of an entire topic."); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 ("And [government] may not
select which issues are worth discussing or debating . . .).
139. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[Wle cannot indulge
the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.").
140. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("effect on
some speakers or messages"); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) ("distinctions in access on the basis of . . . speaker identi-
ty").
141. E.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
142. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791.
143. Id. (emphasis in original). On the same page, the Court explained the
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unless "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression."144 Thus, the Court held a facially
subject-matter-based restriction on adult theaters to be
content-neutral, since the purpose was to prevent harm to the
neighborhood rather than to suppress adult movies. 45 If the
infringement is content-neutral, strict scrutiny normally does
not apply.1 46
The question whether an infringement of protected
speech is content-based or content-neutral can be difficult and
subtle. In the recent flag-burning cases,147 for example, five
Justices concluded that the Texas and United States flag pro-
tection statutes are content-based, because they suppress ex-
pression "out of concern for its likely communicative im-
pact." 4 ' The four dissenters argued that the statutes are
content-neutral, because punishment is authorized without
reference to the particular ideas flag burners wish to communi-
cate. The resignations of Justices Brennan and Marshall create
a distinct possibility that the dissenters' views will soon have
majority support. 149
(2) Strict scrutiny: the general rule
If the infringement is directed at point of view, subject
matter, choice of words, identity of the speaker, or communi-
cative impact and the government-purpose test outlined in
point more fully:
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech
cases generally . . . is whether the government has adopted a regula-
tion of speech because of disagreement with the message it con-
veys . . . . The government's purpose is the controlling consideration.
A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expres-
sion is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some
speakers or messages but not others.
Id. (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)). See also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
144. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), quoted with approval in
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2407, and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407, (1989). Cf
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415-16 (1989).
145. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
146. In such cases, one should use the track-two analysis applicable to
content-neutral infringements, see infra notes 282-350 and accompanying text.
147. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989).
148. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2409.
149. It is beyond the scope of this article to debate this issue; time will tell.
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Ward v. Rock Against Racism"'5° is not met, the infringement is
content-based and, as a general rule, subject to strict scrutiny.
In such cases, respondent must prove that the infringement
furthers a compelling interest and is necessary.
51
(a) Did the conduct further a
compelling interest?
i. Compelling interest?
To satisfy strict scrutiny, respondent must prove that the
infringement was undertaken to further a compelling pur-
pose.15 2 To satisfy this requirement,, respondent must show
that its purpose was both constitutionally permissible and very
strong. 5 ' In addition, the purpose relied upon must have
been the government's actual purpose rather than a hypotheti-
cal purpose dreamed up after the fact by a government attor-
ney or judge."
Strict scrutiny involves a stringent version of end-scrutiny
that often results in invalidation of the challenged conduct.
For example, the Court has held that the following interests
are not sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny: promot-
ing respect for the American flag, 55 protecting a non-captive
audience from being offended, 56 avoiding the appearance of
corruption caused by independent expenditures by individuals
150. Supra note 143.
151. "The government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest." Sable Communications of Cal.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
152. Id.
153. See infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
154. E.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (traffic safety
justification rejected because it was not the government's actual purpose).
155. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 387, 417 (1989); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
These cases suggest that the interest in promoting respect for the flag is not per-
missible, because the first amendment prohibits the government from imposing
viewpoints on people. Cf Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
156. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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in support of a political candidate," 7 and preventing pro bo-
no attorneys from stirring up litigation.15 8
On the other hand, the Court has found the following
interests sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny: pre-
venting corruption and the appearance of corruption resulting
from campaign contributions159 and corporate campaign ex-
penditures on behalf of candidates, 6 ' protecting the mass
media's function of informing the public,16' eradicating sex
discrimination in membership practices of business clubs, 162
protecting the well-being of children,' protecting the safety
of persons and property, 64 and protecting captive audiences
from offensive communications. 65
ii. Substantially effective means?
The "compelling interest" prong of strict scrutiny requires
not only that a compelling government interest exist, but also
that respondent's conduct "further" that interest, i.e., that the
conduct be a substantially effective means for advancing that
interest.'66 If the challenged government action makes only a
157. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
158. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
159. E.g., Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
160. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1990)
("compelling state interest of eliminating from the political process the corrosive
effect of political 'war chests' amassed with the aid of the legal advantages given
to corporations").
161. Id. at 1401-02.
162. Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
163. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("[T]here
is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors."). Accord Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1696 (1990); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
164. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
165. E.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (dictum). This
is especially true if the audience is captive in their homes. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("One important aspect of residential privacy is protec-
tion of the unwilling listener."); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) ("The
State's interest in protecting the well being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.").
166. E.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) (holding that
strict scrutiny was not satisfied in part because of "serious doubts whether Florida
is, in fact, serving, with this statute, the significant interests."); Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 226 (1989) ("advances that inter-
est"); see also Calloway, supra note 131, at 450.
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remote or speculative contribution to achieving the
government's purpose, strict scrutiny is not satisfied.
Here are some examples of government losses stemming
from lack of proof that its means were substantially effective. A
ban on showing movies containing nudity at drive-ins visible
from a public road was not a sufficiently effective means of
furthering traffic safety, because the ban did not cover other
equally distracting movie scenes.' 67 Prohibiting corporations
from making independent expenditures in a ballot-issue elec-
tion was not an effective means to protect shareholders with
differing views because the prohibition was grossly
underinclusive and overinclusive."6 s Imposing money damag-
es awards on newspapers for publishing the name of a rape
victim was not sufficiently effective in protecting the victim's
privacy where the government itself had already let the cat out
of the bag by disclosing the name. 69 Banning political par-
ties from endorsing candidates in primary elections was uncon-
stitutional, because while "[m]aintaining a stable political sys-
tem is, unquestionably, a compelling state interest, . . .[respon-
dent] never adequately explain[ed] how banning parties from
endorsing or opposing primary candidates advances that inter-
est."
1 70
(b) Is the infringement necessary?
To satisfy the final part of strict scrutiny, respondent must
prove that the challenged infringement of protected speech is
necessary to further a compelling interest.17 ' In other words,
the infringement must be the "least restrictive means" available
for furthering the [compelling] interest. 172 If another equally
effective yet less speech-restrictive alternative is available, there
167. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
168. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The statute was
underinclusive because it only applied to referenda, not to normal legislative
lobbying; it was overinclusive because it applied even if the shareholders unani-
mously approved the expenditure.
169. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 538 (1989).
170. Eu, 489 U.S. at 226 (1989).
171. E.g., Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). The
Court sometimes uses "narrowly tailored" as a synonym for "necessary." This is
problematic, however, since "narrowly tailored" has another definition in track-two
cases. See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
172. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126.
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is no compelling justification for infringing free speech; re-
spondent should instead use the less onerous alternative.
Respondent is not required to use less onerous alterna-
tives that will not get the job done. For example, the Court
permitted the Minnesota State Fair to confine sale of literature
and solicitation of funds to licensed booths, because "it is quite
improbable that the alternative means . . . would deal ade-
quately with the problems posed.""'3 Apparently respondent
has the burden to prove that available less restrictive alterna-
tives would not be effective.'74 It is unsettled whether the
government must use less onerous alternatives that are effec-
tive, but not "equally effective."
The necessity requirement has proved fatal to respondent
in many cases. Here are some examples. Requiring teachers to
disclose all organizational ties is unconstitutional, since more
narrowly focused questions would be just as effective in ensur-
ing teachers' loyalty. 75 A ban on displaying hostile signs
within 500 feet of a foreign embassy in Washington, D.C. was
unconstitutional, since Congress itself had adopted a less re-
strictive alternative that proved effective for embassies outside
Washington. 176 Imposing damages for publishing a rape
victim's name obtained from the government is unconstitution-
al, because the government can use "less drastic means" that
prevent disclosure of the name in the first place. 77 And a
ban on non- obscene dial-a-porn messages is unconstitutional,
because credit card requirements, access codes, and message
scrambling provide a satisfactory, less restrictive alterna-
tive. 78
173. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
654 (1981). Actually Heffion is not a strict scrutiny case, but the same reasoning
applies in strict scrutiny cases.
174. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 129-30.
175. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
176. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324-26 (1988).
177. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989).
178. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989). In Sable
Communications, the Court required the FCC to use potentially "extremely effec-
tive" alternatives, even though the alternatives were not "fail-safe." Id. at 130.
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(3) Applications of strict scrutiny to specific
content-based infringements
(a) Offensive speech
When the government seeks to regulate protected speech
because it is offensive to the audience, the regulation must
normally satisfy strict scrutiny. 7 9
In Cohen v. California,181 for example, respondent at-
tempted to punish Cohen for appearing in the hallway of a
Los Angeles County courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the
words "Fuck the draft." The Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction, holding that the conviction violated free speech. First,
the Court held that the words on the jacket were protected by
the first amendment, especially because they were central to
communicating the emotive content of Cohen's message. 8 '
Second, the Court held that the government's justification for
infringing Cohen's protected speech was not sufficient to satis-
fy the first amendment. The government's interest in protect-
ing the audience from exposure to Cohen's profanity was not
sufficiently compelling, the Court held, because onlookers
could simply avert their eyes if they were offended. The opin-
ion implied, however, that the interest in protecting viewers
from exposure to the unwanted message would be sufficiently
compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny if the viewers were a "cap-
tive audience" unable to avoid the message.
Similarly, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,"s2 the Court
struck down a ban on showing films containing nudity at a
drive-in theater visible from a public street. Since the infringe-
ment of protected speech'8 3 was content-based, the Court ap-
179. Some kinds of offensive speech such as fighting words and obscenity are
outside the first amendment and subject to government regulation if the rational
basis test is met. See supra notes 51-58, 59-90 and accompanying text. Narrow
exceptions also exist where the offensive speech fits the Court's definition of
"disfavored speech." See infra notes 421-40 and accompanying text.
180. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
181. The Court had previously stated that profanity is outside the first amend-
ment. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). Cohen repudiat-
ed this dictum.
182. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
183. The speech was protected because the ban was not limited to obscenity.
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plied strict scrutiny. Again the Court suggested that the privacy
interest of a captive audience might be sufficient to satisfy
strict scrutiny but held that the privacy justification was not
compelling in the case at hand because offended viewers on
public streets could simply avert their eyes. The Court empha-
sized that drive-in movies do not intrude into the privacy of
the home, suggesting that offensive communications that in-
vade the home might be subject to regulation. The Court also
rejected the government's traffic safety justification, holding
that this was not the government's actual purpose and, even if
it were, the means were not sufficiently effective, since the
statute failed to ban other scenes equally likely to distract driv-
ers.
Again, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n.,Is4 the Court struck down a ban on billing inserts
containing controversial policy discussions because the
content-based restriction did not further a compelling interest.
Offended customers were not a "captive audience." They could
simply throw the inserts away, so the inserts did not constitute
the kind of "intolerable" invasion of privacy needed to satisfy
strict scrutiny." 5
On the other hand, "[t]he First Amendment permits the
government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the
'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech."'8 6
(b) Campaign contributions and
expenditures
Contributing money to candidates in political campaigns
and making independent expenditures on their behalf are po-
litical speech fully protected by the first amendment,'87 and
content-based infringements of such activities are subject to
strict scrutiny. 18 Thus, the Court struck down a federal stat-
ute restricting independent expenditures by individuals, includ-
ing the candidates themselves, 8 9 and by political action com-
184. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
185. Id. at 541.
186. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
187. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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mittees (PACs), 9 ' holding that the government interest in
avoiding corruption and the appearance of corruption was not
sufficiently compelling in that context. Similarly, the Court
struck down a statute banning corporations from making inde-
pendent expenditures in opposition to a graduated income tax
referendum, holding that the interests in encouraging individu-
al involvement in elections and preserving public confidence in
democracy were not compelling, at least in the context of ref-
erenda on public issues, and that the interest in protecting
shareholders who disagree with the corporation's views was not
served effectively in light of the statute's underinclusiveness
and overinclusiveness."'l
On the other hand, the Court upheld restrictions on con-
tributions to candidates, holding that the purpose "to limit the
actuality and appearance of corruption" is compelling and that
the means were sufficiently effective and necessary.1 92 Simi-
larly, the Court upheld a statute barring corporations from
making independent expenditures from corporate treasury
funds on behalf of candidates, holding that strict scrutiny was
satisfied because the statute was "precisely tailored to serve the
compelling state interest of eliminating from the political pro-
cess the corrosive effect of political 'war chests' amassed with
the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations.
' 93
(c) Privacy
To what degree does the first amendment bar the govern-
ment from punishing a party who communicates to the public
embarrassing but true information about private individuals?
Because such infringements are content-based, the Court ap-
plies strict scrutiny. In The Florida Star v. B.JF.,194 the Court
referred to "our synthesis of prior cases involving attempts to
punish truthful publication: '[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then
190. FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
191. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
192. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (contributions to individual candi-
date); California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (contributions to
multi-candidate PAC).
193. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1990).
194. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of
the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order.'"'95 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held
that the interest in protecting the privacy and safety of rape
victims was an interest of the highest order, but that punishing
the newspaper was not effective since other avenues of disclo-
sure remained unpunished, and not necessary since "the gov-
ernment had, but failed to utilize, far more limited means of
guarding against dissemination than the extreme step of pun-
ishing truthful speech." 1
96
(d) Charitable solicitation
"[S]olicitation of charitable contributions is protected
speech ....""' This is because "charitable appeals for funds,
on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech inter-
ests-communication of information, the dissemination and
propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of caus-
es-that are within the protection of the First Amend-
ment."'98 Government restrictions on charitable solicitation
are subject to strict scrutiny since they are "direct restriction[s]
on protected First Amendment activity" 9' and are directed
at the content of the speech (requests for money).
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court has struck down a num-
ber of state regulations of charitable solicitation. In Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment °° and Secretary
of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,2°1 the Court invalidated bans
on solicitation by organizations that did not use at least 75% of
their receipts for charity. The government's interest in prevent-
ing fraud did not satisfy strict scrutiny, because that interest
"can be better served by measures less intrusive than a direct
195. Id. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979)).
196. Florida Stai; 491 U.S. at 538.
197. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 789 (1988). Accord
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
198. Village of Schaumbuig 444 U.S. at 632, quoted with approval in Riley, 487
U.S. at 788.
199. Village of Schaumbui 444 U.S. at 632.
200. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
201. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
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prohibition on solicitation. Fraudulent misrepresentations can
be prohibited and the penal laws used to punish such conduct
directly." 212 The interests in protecting safety and residential
privacy were also insufficient, because the 75% rule was inef-
fective ("householders are equally disturbed [and endangered]
by solicitation on behalf of organizations satisfying the 75 per-
cent requirement")2°" and unnecessary ("permitting home-
owners to bar solicitors from their property by posting
signs . . . [is a] less intrusive and more effective measure").
20 4
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,2 °5 the Court
struck down a "reasonable fee" limit for similar reasons and
also a requirement that, before appealing for funds, solicitors
disclose the percentage of contributions actually given to chari-
ty. The disclosure requirement did not satisfy strict scrutiny
because the government's interest was not compelling and
because "more benign and narrowly tailored options are avail-
able."20 6 For example, "the State may itself publish the de-
tailed financial disclosure forms it requires professional
fundraisers to file."
207
(4) Exceptions to the general rule that
content-based infringements are subject to strict scrutiny
Not all content-based infringements of protected speech
are analyzed by applying strict scrutiny. Content-based infringe-
ments of most commercial speech are subject to mid-level
means-end scrutiny.20 8 Content-based punishment for inciting
illegal acts is subject to incitement/clear and present danger
analysis. 2 9 Content-based damage awards for defamation are
subject to the actual malice test and/or other specialized
tests.2 10 Content-based regulation of electronic broadcasting
202. Village of Schaumbug 444 U.S. at 637.
203. Id. at 638.
204. Id. at 639.
205. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
206. Id. at 800.
207. Id. The Court also invalidated a licensing requirement for solicitors
because it "permits a delay without limit." d. at 802. See infia note 280 and
accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 351-77 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 447-91 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 492-539 and accompanying text.
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is subject to mid-level means-end scrutiny or rationality review
depending on whether the regulation restricts or enhances the
flow of communications to the audience.211 Content-based
regulation of speech in nonpublic government forums is per-
mitted if it is point-of-view neutral and rational.212 And
content-based restrictions on certain types of offensive speech
are permitted if specialized versions of rationality review are satisfied.1
b) Freedom of association
This section discusses freedom of expressive and private
association. Government action infringing these rights is sub-
ject to strict scrutiny. Free association analysis has two major
components: Did respondent infringe claimant's protected free
association interests, and, if so, can respondent satisfy strict
scrutiny? The next two subsections discuss these two is-
sues. 214
(1) Applicability: Did respondent infringe
claimant's protected interest in free association?
(a) Association protected by first
amendment?
The first amendment protects two kinds of association, ex-
pressive association and private association. 2 5 Each needs to
be defined separately.
211. See infra notes 378-82 and 441-44 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 388-411 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 42140 and accompanying text.
214. Unlike the other sections of part IIB, this section discusses both the
applicability and compliance components of freedom of association analysis. This
is because the issue of what kinds of association are protected by the first amend-
ment did not fit comfortably in Part IIA.
215. E.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989); Board of Directors
v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
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i. Expressive association
The first amendment protects "expressive" association, i.e.,
association for purposes of engaging in protected communica-
tive activities. 216 Freedom of expressive association is an im-
plied rather than express first amendment right. The right to
associate for purposes of communication is implicitly protect-
ed, because expression is more effective when individuals join
together to communicate. 2" Thus, for example, a mass dem-
onstration is likely to make a greater impact on the audience
than a single picketer. Similarly, the pooled funds of a group
can be used to buy media space that individual members could
not afford.
Not all association is sufficiently communicative to trigger
first amendment protections. For example, generalized social
association, such as "the activity of... dance hall patrons-
coming together to engage in recreational dancing-is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment."2 1  Although the Court has
not specified the precise test for distinguishing generalized
social association from expressive association, one can safely
assume that association is protected if a significant purpose of
the activity is to communicate regarding matters of public in-
terest. Thus, political association is plainly protected,219 as is
association for purposes of litigation.22 °
216. The seminal case on this point is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
217. "Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association .... " Id. at 460.
218. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25 ("[W]e do not think the Constitution recognizes a
generalized right of 'social association' that includes chance encounters in dance
halls.").
219. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214
(1989) (political parties); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (NAACP);
NAACP v. Alabama ex teL Patterson, 357 U.S. 479 (1958) (NAACP).
220. "[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts
is a fundamental right within the protection of the first amendment." United
Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971). Accord In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978); UMW v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
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ii. Private association
In the landmark 1987 case, Board of Directors v. Rotary
Club,2" ' the Supreme Court held that the first amendment pro-
tects freedom of private association. 2  As the Court put it,
"We have emphasized that the First Amendment protects those
relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose
'deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few
other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also dis-
tinctively personal aspects of one's life.' 22' 3  The nexus
between private association and free speech was best explained
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, where the Court stated that
the "personal bonds" protected by the Constitution are those
that have "played a critical role in the culture and traditions of
the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and
beliefs. ,2
24
Not all group activities are "private" associations protected
by the first amendment. To identify which associations are
protected, the Court uses a three-part test focusing on size,
selectivity, and seclusion. 25 If the group is small, it is more
likely to be a protected private association.226 If the group's
membership practices are selective rather than inclusive, it is
more likely protected." 7 And if the group's activities are se-
cluded, i.e., shielded from public observation, the association is
more likely protected. 228 No single factor is necessary or suf-
ficient; all three must be weighed. The classic private associa-
221. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
222. A few years earlier the Court held that the Constitution protects the free-
dom of private association. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
But Rotaiy Club was the first case to link this right to the first amendment.
223. Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
224. 468 U.S. at 618-19, quoted with appivval in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
110 S. Ct. 596, 611 (1990).
225. Robeits, 468 U.S. at 620 ("relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others"). Accord
Rotaiy Club, 481 U.S. at 546.
226. Rotaty Club, 481 U.S. at 546 (Rotary Clubs' large size supports conclusion
that clubs are not private associations).
227. E.g., id. (Rotary Clubs' inclusive membership policies support conclusion
that clubs are not private associations).
228. E.g., id. at 546-47 (Rotary Clubs' policy of inviting nonmembers to meet-
ings supports conclusion that clubs are not private associations).
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tion is the nuclear family, which is usually small, selective (par-
ents and children only), and secluded in the core area of priva-
cy, the home.
229
(b) Infringement?
If the case involves protected expressive or private associa-
tion, claimant must next prove that respondent infringed that
interest. As in the case of free speech,2 s° to determine wheth-
er an infringement occurred, one must evaluate the totality of
the circumstances and make a common sense judgment as to
whether respondent's conduct substantially interfered with
claimant's right to associate. For example, the Court held that
denying food stamps to families of striking workers did not
infringe claimants' freedom of private association, since "it is
extremely unlikely that close relatives would choose to live
apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps" and
denial therefore does not ""'directly and substantially"
interfere' with appellees' ability to associate."231
Of course, an outright ban on a protected form of associa-
tion constitutes an infringement. 232 Action short of an out-
right ban also constitutes an infringement if it entails a "likeli-
hood of substantial restraint" on free association.23 For ex-
ample, denial of privileges such as government employ-
ment 23 4  and professional licenses2 3 5  based on the
applicant's organizational memberships infringes free associa-
tion. Similarly, loyalty oaths focusing on organizational ties
229. The freedom of private association extends beyond the nuclear family to
include a right to live with close blood relatives other than parents and children.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
230. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
231. Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 388 (1988). See supra notes 114-18 and
accompanying text.
232. E.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (ban on attorney solicitation of
clients for pro bono public interest litigation); UMW v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
217 (1967) (ban on union's retaining attorneys to handle workers' compensation
claims).
233. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
234. E.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (1990) ("Condi-
tioning public employment on the provision of support for the favored political
party 'unquestionably inhibits protected . . . association.'") (quoting Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976)); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
235. E.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
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may infringe free association."3 6 Infringements may also re-
sult from reporting and disclosure requirements that invade
the privacy of associations. Thus, an order requiring the
NAACP to disclose the names of its rank-and-file members in-
fringed free association, because, by exposing the members to
threats of economic and physical reprisal, such disclosure was
likely to deter prospective members and contributors from
associating with the NAACP."3 7 On the other hand, the
Court suggested that requiring Rotary Clubs to admit women
did not infringe the constitutional rights of club members,
because admitting women increases rather than decreases the
members' opportunities for association.23 8
(2) Compliance: strict scrutiny
If respondent infringed claimant's protected free associa-
tion interest, the first amendment applies, and the next issue is
whether respondent can satisfy strict scrutiny by proving that
the challenged conduct is a substantially effective and neces-
sary means to further a compelling interest. 23 9
(a) Did the conduct further a compel-
ling interest?
i. Compelling interest?
To satisfy strict scrutiny, respondent must show that its
actual purpose for undertaking the challenged conduct was
both constitutionally permissible and very strong.2 40 Thus,
for example, the government's interest in preventing attorneys
from "stirring up litigation" was not sufficiently strong to satis-
236. E.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
237. NAACP v. Alabama ex irL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Cf Elfbrandt,
384 U.S. at 11; Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960).
238. Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
239. Again, the seminal case on this point is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel
Patterson, 357 U.S. 357 U.S. 449 (1958), a landmark case in the development of
strict scrutiny as a major test in constitutional law.
240. Cf supra notes 152-65 and accompanying text.
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fy strict scrutiny in the context of NAACP activities not involv-
ing litigation for pecuniary gain.
241
In contrast, the interest in eradicating discrimination
against women and assuring that women have access to busi-
ness contacts is compelling.2 42 Similarly, the government in-
terests in "[m]aintaining a stable political system" and "preserv-
ing the integrity of its election process" are sufficiently compel-
ling to satisfy strict scrutiny.24s
ii. Substantially effective means?
To satisfy strict scrutiny, respondent must also prove that
its challenged conduct "furthers" its compelling interest, i.e.,
that the conduct is a substantially effective means for advanc-
ing that interest.244 This requirement has been decisive in
some cases. For example, the Court held that requiring the
NAACP to disclose the names of its rank and file members is
not a substantially effective method to further the
government's interest in determining whether the NAACP was
doing business in Alabama.245 Similarly, the Court held that
a legislative investigation of NAACP members was not an effec-
tive method for combatting subversion absent proof of a nexus
between the group and subversive activities.246 The Court al-
so struck down California's ban on political party endorse-
ments of candidates in primaries, because, although the inter-
est in avoiding voter confusion and undue influence is compel-
ling, "there is no evidence that California's ban on party prima-
ry endorsements serves that purpose."
24 7
241. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
242. Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 487 U.S. 537 (1987).
243. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 226,
231 (1989).
244. Cf supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
245. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
246. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546
(1963) ("[t]he State [must] convincingly show a substantial relation between the
information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.").
247. Eu, 489 U.S. at 229.
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(b) Is the infringement necessary?
To satisfy the final prong of strict scrutiny, respondent
must prove that the challenged conduct is necessary, i.e., that it
is the least restrictive means available for furthering the com-
pelling interest. 48 For example, membership in a group may
not be punished unless the group itself engages in unlawful
activity and the member was active, knew of the illegal activity,
and specifically intended to further that activity.2 49 Similarly,
broad-ranging questions concerning communist associations of
bar applicants are not permitted,25 ° while narrowly tailored
inquiries are permitted if they are preliminary to more focused
inquiries concerning the specific nature of those associa-
tions.2 5' In Shelton v. Tucker,252 the Court held that com-
pelled disclosure of teachers' organizational ties violated the
first amendment, because "less drastic means" were available
for furthering the government interest in insuring teachers'
loyalty. Recently, the Court struck down Illinois' political pa-
tronage system because less restrictive alternatives were avail-
able, 2 53 and it also invalidated a California statute regulating
internal affairs of political parties, because "the State has not
shown that its regulation of internal party governance is neces-
sary to the integrity of the election process. "254
c) Prior restraints
One of the central purposes of the first amendment was
to prevent the government from imposing "prior restraints" on
248. Cf supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
249. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
250. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
251. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971).
252. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
253. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990):
[T]he government can ensure employee effectiveness . . . through the
less drastic means of discharging staff members whose work is inade-
quate ... [and] can meet its need for politically loyal employees to
implement its policies by the less intrusive measure of dismissing, on
political grounds, only those employees in policymaking positions.
Id. at 2734.
254. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 232
(1989).
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free speech, 255 and it remains true "that prior restraint is es-
pecially disfavored under the First Amendment."256 As the
Court put it in Bantam Books v. Sullivan,5 ' "[A]ny system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." This
heavy presumption translates into the general rule that prior
restraints are subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, they have tradi-
tionally been subject to the strictest first amendment scrutiny.
Moreover, the Court has developed some additional tests for
controlling prior restraints.
Analysis of prior restraints proceeds in two steps. First,
one must determine whether the infringement of free speech
constitutes a prior restraint. If so, one must apply strict scruti-
ny and/or the other special rules the Court uses in prior re-
straint cases. The next two subsections discuss these two steps.
(1) Prior restraint?
The essence of a "prior restraint" and the characteristic
that distinguishes it from a "subsequent punishment" is that
the restriction takes place prior to publication, delaying the
communication and perhaps cutting it off altogether..58 The
central evil of prior restraints is that the government prevents
the audience from receiving the communication, thereby en-
gaging in the "censorship" that the first amendment was de-
signed to prevent.
255. The battle for free speech in England was directed primarily against the
traditional requirement that publishers obtain a license from the government
before distributing written literature of any sort, a classic system of prior restraint.
"Blackstone, indeed, argued that prior restraint was the only evil to be guarded
against, and that subsequent punishment was permissible . . . ." C. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1203 (1991) (emphasis in original). Today, of course, the
first amendment is not limited to prior restraints.
256. Id. at 1202.
257. 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
258. "[T]he regulations we have found invalid as prior restraints have 'had this
in common: they gave public officials the power to deny use of a forum in
advance of actual expression.' . .. . The relevant question is whether the challenged
regulation authoizes suppression in advance of its expression .... " Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 n.5 (1989) (quoting Southeastern Promotions v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975)). Accord Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697,
706 n.2 (1986) ("advance determination that the distribution of particular materials
is prohibited").
[Vol. 31
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Several kinds of government action have been identified
as prior restraints. First and foremost are licensing systems
such as those in pre-revolutionary England, especially licensing
systems which grant the licensor broad discretion to grant or
deny the permit.259 Second, injunctions against engaging in
communicative activities are prior restraints.26 ° Third, confis-
cations of books, magazines, movies, and other communica-
tions are prior restraints, since they prevent distribution of the
publications. 261' Fourth, denials of facilities for making com-
munications-for example, exclusion of a play from a munici-
pal theater-are prior restraints. 262 Fifth, use of blacklists
resulting in exclusion of materials from bookstores, movie the-
aters, or other avenues of communication are prior
restraints.263 In each case, the key characteristic is that the
restraint takes effect before the communication occurs.
(2) Compliance with Supreme Court tests
(a) Strict scrutiny
The landmark prior restraint case, Near v. Minnesota,264
established a "general rule" that prior restraints are not al-
lowed and stressed that, while this rule is not absolute, excep-
tions would be highly extraordinary. 265 In modern parlance,
this translates into strict scrutiny, indeed extremely strict scruti-
266ny. In other words, courts should not permit prior re-
259. See infa notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
260. E.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1964).
261. E.g., Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989); Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
262. E.g., Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (refusal to
permit performance of rock musical "Hair" in municipal theater).
263. E.g., Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1973).
264. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (order "abating" Saturday Press, i.e., ordering it not
to publish, is an unconstitutional prior restraint).
265. Near suggested, for example, that a prior restraint might be permissible to
prevent disclosure of the timing of planned troop movements, but it also strongly
suggested that something like urgent military necessity would be required before a
prior restraint would be allowed. 283 U.S. at 716.
266. See New York Times Co. v. United States [Pentagon Papes Case], 403 U.S.
713 (1971). In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), a free
press/fair trial case striking down a gag order banning newspaper publicity about
a criminal trial, the Court used a test that appears to be a hybrid of strict scru-
tiny and clear and present danger analysis. See infra notes 269, 489 and accompa-
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straints absent a clear showing that they are necessary and ef-
fective means to further the most compelling government in-
terests.
To avoid undue repetition, the components of strict scruti-
ny will not be spelled out here in detail, but a few words of
explanation are in order. First, for a prior restraint to with-
stand scrutiny, the government interest must be extremely
compelling. Near suggested that military necessity would suf-
fice.267 A more recent lower court case suggested that pre-
venting proliferation of nuclear weapons would also suf-
fice.26 But the Supreme Court has struck down prior re-
straints despite some very important interests, including the
interest in providing a fair criminal trial269 and the alleged
national security interest in avoiding disclosure of military se-
crets. 27 ° Second, even if the government's interest is compel-
ling, prior restraints will not be allowed unless they are effec-
tive in furthering the interest. Thus, for example, an injunction
against publishing a magazine article explaining how to make a
nuclear bomb would have been inappropriate after the infor-
mation was published elsewhere, since the prior restraint
would no longer have been effective in preventing the public
from obtaining the information.27 ' Finally, prior restraints
are not permitted if any less restrictive alternative would get
the job done.2 72
(b) Other tests used for licensing
systems
Government requirements that a license be obtained be-
fore engaging in communicative activities are not absolutely
banned, 273 but the Court has developed two specialized tests
nying text.
267. 283 U.S. at 716.
268. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(preliminary injunction granted barring publication of magazine article explaining
how to make a nuclear bomb).
269. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
270. New York Times Co. v. United States [Pentagon Papers Case] 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
271. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
272. E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
273. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (movie licensing
system upheld).
930 [Vol. 31
BASIC FREE SPEECH ANALYSIS
that licensing systems must satisfy. First, the system must im-
pose clear guidelines that limit the licensor's discretion. 4
Second, the system must comply with procedural guidelines
established by Freedman v. Maryland.
27 5
i. Specific guidelines limiting
discretion
A long line of famous Supreme Court cases prohibits con-
ferring broad discretion on government officials to grant or
deny permits to engage in communicative activities. 276 The
Court's reasoning is that licensors with broad discretion are
free to impose prior restraints on applicants based on the con-
tent of the proposed speech and that such content-based cen-
sorship is a core evil against which the first amendment was
directed. The Court consistently strikes down licensing systems
conferring unguided discretion on the licensor without even
277applying means-end scrutiny.
ii. Freedman procedures
In, addition to the "clear guidelines" requirement, licens-
ing systems are unconstitutional unless they satisfy the so-called
Freedman standards, which impose three procedural require-
ments designed to insure that the licensing system does not
deter or unduly delay protected communications. First, the
licensor must bear the burden of proving that the proposed
communication is unprotected by the first amendment and
that a denial of the permit is therefore constitutional.278 Sec-
ond, the licensor must either issue the license or go to court to
obtain a judicial determination that the communication is un-
protected.279  Third, "the procedure must also assure a
274. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
275. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
276. E.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750
(1988); Cox v. New Hampshire, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) [Cox I]; Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
277. If one did apply strict scrutiny to these content-based prior restraints,
they would fail since a less restrictive alternative exists, namely use of a system
that does contain specific guidelines.
278. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
279. Id. at 58-59. In other words, the final decision must be made by a court
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prompt final judicial decision. "2 0 Thus, the movie licensing
system at issue in Freedman was unconstitutional, because it
imposed the burden of proving first amendment coverage on
the applicant, authorized the licensor rather than a court to
make the final decision on whether the material was protected,
and failed to insure that the final decision would be issued promptly."
This completes the discussion of infringements of free
speech that are subject to strict scrutiny. The discussion now
turns to infringements that are subject to less intense versions
of means-end scrutiny.
2) Infringements subject to mid-level means-end
scrutiny
Some infringements of protected speech are subject to
mid-level means-end scrutiny, less intense than strict scrutiny
but more intense than rationality review. These infringements
are presumptively unconstitutional, but they are permitted if
respondent proves that they are narrowly tailored to further a
significant or substantial government interest. This section
discusses five lines of free speech cases in which the Court uses
mid-level means-end scrutiny: (1) content-neutral regulations of
the time, place, or manner of speech, (2) regulations of speech
plus conduct, including symbolic speech, (3) regulations of
commercial speech, (4) communication-restricting regulations
of electronic broadcasting, and (5) regulations of prisoners'
outgoing personal correspondence.
rather than by the licensor. Cf Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 67
(1989) (mass seizure of books not permitted until obscenity has been "properly
established in an adversary proceeding").
280. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59. Accord Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 802 (1988) (North Carolina's licensing requirement for professional
charitable solicitors held unconstitutional because it "permits a delay without
limit.").
281. A recent case holds that the first Freedman standard does not apply to
licensing systems that do not create the danger of censorship that Freedman was
concerned about. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990). "Because
the licensing scheme at issue in this case does not present the grave 'dangers of a
censorship system,' . . . we conclude that the full procedural protections set forth
in Freedman are not required." Id. at 606. The Court declined to apply the Freed-
man burden of proof requirement, because the government was not passing
judgment on speech and the proprietors of sexually oriented businesses were
strongly motivated to get a license. The Court nevertheless struck down the
licensing system because it did not require a prompt final judicial decision.
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a) Time, place, and manner regulations
Restrictions on the time, place, or manner of exercising
first amendment rights in public streets, parks, and other pub-
lic forums282 are constitutional if respondent proves that
(1) the restrictions are content-neutral; (2) they serve a signifi-
cant government interest; and (3) ample alternative channels
exist for exercising the first amendment rights. 83 These re-
quirements are referred to as the Virginia Pharmacy-Heffron
test.
(1) Content-neutral?
To trigger mid-level means-end scrutiny rather than the
more demanding strict scrutiny applicable to most
content-based infringements, respondent must prove that the
regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech is
content-neutral. 284 Infringements are content-neutral if they
are "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."
285
282. The rules discussed in this section do not apply when the property in
question is a "nonpublic forum." In such cases, a more lenient set of require-
ments applies. See infia notes 388-403 and accompanying text, which also explain
the rules used to distinguish public and nonpublic forums.
283. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988); Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981). As the Court has
stated:
We have often approved restrictions of that kind [reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions] provided that they are justified with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve
a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
284. In other words, the "switching question" that determines whether the free
speech analysis proceeds on "track one" with its strict scrutiny test or "track two"
with its mid-level means-end scrutiny test is whether the infringement is
content-based or content-neutral. "[Tihe appropriate level of scrutiny is initially
tied to whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited and permitted speech
on the basis of content." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481.
285. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
See also, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); Heffnrn, 452 U.S. at 648;
Visginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
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As stated earlier,211 infringements of free speech are
usually considered content-based if they are directed at the
communication's point of view, subject matter, choice of
words, source, or communicative impact on the audience.
However, even facially content-based infringements will be
deemed content- neutral if "[t]he government's purpose is...
unrelated to the content of expression. "287 Thus, for exam-
ple, a facially subject-matter-based place regulation of "adult"
theaters was deemed content-neutral, because the
government's purpose was to control the "secondary effects"
on the surrounding community rather than to suppress erotic
movies.
288
Determining whether infringements are content-based or
content-neutral is not an easy task. The Court has not fully
articulated the criteria to be used in making the distinction.
The Court has held that the communicative impact of speech
on the minds of the audience is not a "secondary effect," and
that regulations designed to protect the minds of listeners are
therefore content-based. 89 Pending further clarification, the
test is whether the regulation is "justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, a regrettably ambigu-
ous test.
If the time, place, or manner regulation is content-based,
the Virginia Pharmacy-Heffron test is not applicable, and the
analysis should proceed on track one, which usually requires
strict scrutiny. If, on the other hand, the regulation is
286. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
287. The Court stated:
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech
cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because
of disagreement with the message it conveys . . . .The government's
purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves pur-
poses unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even
if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others . . . . Government regulation of expressive activity is content-
neutral so long as it is 'Justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech."
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (citations and emphasis omitted).
288. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
289. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
290. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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content-neutral, one should apply the remaining components
of mid-level means-end scrutiny.
(2) Narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest?
Virginia Pharmacy-Heffron mid-level means-end scrutiny has
three components. First, respondent must identify a significant
interest that the regulation was designed to further. Second,
the regulation must be an effective means for furthering that
interest.29' Third, the means chosen must not be substantial-
ly broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest.
The Court apparently considers the second and third compo-
nents to be subparts of a "narrowly tailored" means require-
ment.
292
(a) Significant government interest
Respondent must first prove that its regulation is designed
to serve a "significant" interest. 23 This involves somewhat in-
tensified end scrutiny, more intense than rationality review but
less intense than strict scrutiny. The test presumably involves
three components.294 First, the interest must be constitution-
ally permissible. Second, it must have been the government's
actual purpose rather than one based on after-the-fact specula-
tions by an attorney or judge. Third, the interest must be "sig-
nificant, "295 i.e., somewhat stronger than the merely "valid"
interests that suffice to satisfy rationality review.296
291. As explained below, the effectiveness requirement is much more defer-
ential here than in strict scrutiny cases. See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying
text.
292. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-802 (1989).
293. See supra note 283.
294. This presumption is based on the fact that intensified end scrutiny gener-
ally involves these three components.
295. "[T]he significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light
of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved."
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 650-51
(1981).
296. The Court's most explicit discussion of this point is in Board of Trustees
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989), a commercial speech case. The Fox discussion
applies here because scrutiny of ends in commercial speech cases is essentially the
same as in time, place, and manner cases.
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(b) Narrowly tailored means
As stated above, the narrowly-tailored-means requirement
has two components. The first focuses on the effectiveness of
the regulation. The second focuses on available alternatives
and asks whether the regulation is substantially broader than
necessary.
i. Effectiveness of means
Until recently, this component of time, place, and manner
law seemed comparable to the "demonstrably effective means"
requirement of strict scrutiny. In Rock Against Racism, however,
the Court watered down the requirement, asserting that "the
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the...
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' 297 More-
over, the Court made it clear that judges should defer to
respondent's reasonable judgments regarding the regulation's
effectiveness. As the Court put it, the regulation "is valid so
long as the city could reasonably have determined that its in-
terests overall would be served less effectively without the
sound amplification guideline than with it."298
This "deferential better-than-nothing test" is a significant
retreat from the substantially and demonstrably effective
means requirement. The new test reduces scrutiny of effective-
ness of the means in time, place, and manner cases to little
more than rationality review. 99
ii. Alternatives scrutiny
The regulation must not be "substantially broader than
necessary to achieve the [government's interest]." ' This test
requires courts to determine whether any alternative is avail-
297. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
298. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 801.
299. The test is so weak it mocks the first amendment and makes one wonder
whether the Court can be serious about it.
300. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 800 n. 7 , 802.
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able that would have permitted the government to achieve its
purpose with substantially less effect on free speech. The test is
not the same as the least restrictive means component of strict
scrutiny."0' The "substantially broader than necessary" test is
less demanding, requiring only that the "[g]overnment may not
regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion
of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its
goals." °2
(3) Ample alternative channels?
Finally, time, place, and manner regulations must provide
ample alternative channels for the restricted communica-
tions.03 The Court has also construed this requirement
loosely, requiring only that respondent provide a "reasonable
opportunity" to make the communication somewhere within
the jurisdiction.304  In Playtime Theatres, for example, the
Court concluded that the test was met even though the regula-
tion banned claimant from locating its adult theater in any
301. The Court explicitly rejected the least-restrictive means test:
The Court of Appeals erred in sifting through all the available or
imagined alternative means of regulating sound volume in order to
determine whether the city's solution was "the least intrusive means"
of achieving the desired end. This "less-restrictive-alternative analy-
sis . . . has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity of a
time, place, and manner regulation." ... (R]estrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech are not invalid "simply because
there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome
on speech." . . .
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that
a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must
be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate
content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least-restrictive or
least-intrusive means of doing so.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1989) (citations omitted).
302. Id. at 799. The new test might be labelled a "substantive substantial over-
breadth" test and seems quite similar to the "procedural substantial overbreadth"
test used for determining when third party standing is allowed in free speech
cases. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
303. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
648 (1981); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
304. "In our view, the First Amendment requires only that Renton refrain
from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and oper-
ate an adult theater within the city, and the ordinance before us easily meets this
requirement." City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986).
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part of town other than a 520 acre tract of partly undeveloped
industrial land occupied by warehouses and a freeway.
When regulating speech in public forums such as streets
and parks, the government may not rely on alternative chan-
nels outside the forum, 0 5 but alternative channels outside
the forum may be taken into account when the government
regulates speech in a "limited" public forum such as a state
fair. 3 6 Similarly, when a time, place, or manner regulation
takes the form of an absolute ban on speech within a forum,
the government must prove that the expressive activity is "basi-
cally incompatible with the normal activity" of the area. °7
The line of Supreme Court cases involving time, place,
and manner regulations is far too long to discuss in detail, but
a few examples may be helpful. In the earliest cases, the Court
held that flat bans on handbilling on public streets are uncon-
stitutional because they are substantially overbroad.3 s8 Simi-
larly, flat bans on door-to-door solicitation are unconstitution-
al, because more narrowly tailored bans against distribution at
houses with posted anti-solicitation notices would be effective
while burdening substantially less speech.00
In contrast, prohibitions on loudspeakers emitting "loud
and raucous noises" in public places are permitted.3 " And
the Court upheld a regulation requiring that solicitation of
donations and sale of literature at a state fair be conducted at
assigned booths, because the place restriction was
content-neutral and narrowly tailored to further the substantial
government interest in managing the flow of the crowd and
alternative channels for the communications were ample.3 '
305. E.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939), which stated: "[T]he
streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and
opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appro-
priate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
306. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654-55.
307. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981).
308. E.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). As the Court put it recently:
"[A] complete ban on handbilling would be substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the interests justifying it." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
800 n.7 (1989).
309. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
310. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78 (1949) (quoting the contested city ordi-
nance).
311. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640
[Vol. 31
BASIC FREE SPEECH ANALYSIS
b) Symbolic speech and other "speech plus
conduct"
When speech is linked with physical conduct, the govern-
ment may regulate the physical conduct if the regulation fur-
thers a "substantial" government interest that is "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression" and the incidental infringe-
ment of free speech is "no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.",12 Cases of this kind are often re-
ferred to by the label "speech plus," meaning "speech plus
conduct." The next two sections discuss the Supreme Court's
rules for analyzing speech-plus cases, focusing first on so-called
"symbolic speech" cases and then on other cases in which
speech and physical conduct are combined.
(1) Symbolic speech
People normally communicate by using spoken or written
words. But sometimes they use nonverbal, physical conduct to
express their views. For example, they may display a red
flag,313 refuse to salute the American flag,"1 4 burn a draft
card 15 or an American flag,3 16 wear a black armband,
317
or hold a sleep-in on government property.3 18 Such conduct
is called "symbolic speech."1 9 Like other speech plus con-
duct, it involves a combination of communication and nonver-
bal conduct. In this case the nonverbal conduct is actually used
to communicate.
Analysis of symbolic speech cases involves two steps. First,
one must determine whether claimant's physical conduct is
"speech" protected by the first amendment. Second, one must
determine whether the government's justification is sufficient
(1981).
312. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
313. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
314. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overmuling Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
315. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
316. See United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
317. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
318. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
319. A more fitting name would be "symbolic conduct."
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to satisfy the kind of mid-level means-end scrutiny required by
United States v. O'Brien.2 ° and its progeny.
(a) Is the conduct speech?
The first question in symbolic speech cases is whether
claimant's nonverbal conduct is "sufficiently imbued with ele-
ments of communication to fall within the scope of the
First... Amendment." 2 ' In Spence v. Washington,22  the
Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for determining wheth-
er nonverbal conduct is speech. Claimants must demonstrate
first that they intended their conduct "to convey a particular-
ized message" and second that "in the surrounding circum-
stances the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.""'3
Applying this test, the Court has held that burning a draft
card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse during a
1966 anti-Vietnam War rally was speech, 24 that affixing a
peace symbol to a flag and hanging it in a window to protest
the 1970 Cambodia invasion and Kent State shootings was
speech,32 5 and that burning an American flag at the 1984
Republican convention in Dallas was speech. 26
If the Spence test is not met, the regulation of claimant's
conduct does not trigger first amendment protections and,
unless some other constitutional limit is applicable, is subject
only to substantive due process rationality review. If, on the
other hand, the conduct was intended to convey a particular-
320. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
321. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). The government may
normally regulate physical conduct subject to substantive due process rationality
review.' In order to trigger intensified first amendment scrutiny, claimant must
show that the conduct was communicative, that is, that "he engaged in a form of
protected expression." Id. at 410.
322. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
323. Id. at 410-11. In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the Court reaf-
firmed the Spence test, stating: "In deciding whether particular conduct possesses
sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we
have asked whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it."' Id. at 404.
324. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
325. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
326. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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ized message and likely to do so, the government must satisfy
the intensified scrutiny described in the following section.
(b) O'Brien four-part test
The landmark case on symbolic speech, United States v.
O'Brien,327 created a four-part test requiring the government
to show that the regulation is within the scope of a constitu-
tional power, furthers a substantial government interest unre-
lated to the suppression of free speech, and is no greater than
necessary to further that interest.3 28
i. Within the government's con-
stitutional power?
The first part requires that the regulation of claimant's
symbolic speech be within the scope of the government's con-
stitutional power.129 This is the least important component.
States and their subdivisions have general sovereign power, so
they are always able to satisfy the requirement. Similarly, the
Court has construed the federal government's delegated pow-
ers, especially the commerce power, so broadly that the exis-
tence of federal constitutional power is also a foregone conclu-
327. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
328. Here is the seminal language from O'Brien:
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest
in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms*.... [W]e think it clear that a gov-
ernment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 376-77. The Court recently called the O'Brien test a "deferential standard."
United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2407 (1990). The Court has stated that
the test is basically the same as the test used in time, place, and manner cases,
but the Court still tends to use the version of the test set forth in O'Brien. The
ensuing sections discuss the four O'Brien requirements. Further comments about
the relation between the symbolic speech and time, place, and manner tests fol-
low.
329. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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sion. 3° Indeed, the first part of the O'Brien test is not a first
amendment requirement at all, but merely the standard re-
quirement that the government have some constitutional
source of power to act.
ii. Furthers a substantial govern-
mental interest?
O'Brien's second part, that the "government regulation...
furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est,""' l has two elements. The first involves somewhat intensi-
fied end scrutiny: the regulation's purpose must be to further
a substantial governmental interest. This presumably means
that the government must prove that its actual interest is con-
stitutionally permissible and substantial.3 2 The end scrutiny
required by O'Brien appears to be much less intense than the
compelling interest requirement of strict scrutiny. The Court
has found some rather modest government interests to be
"substantial." In O'Brien, for example, the Court ruled for re-
spondent on the basis of the interests in facilitating communi-
cation between registrants and their draft boards and remind-
ing registrants to notify local boards of address changes. Simi-
larly, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,3 ' the
Court held that the interest in maintaining attractive parks was
substantial enough to satisfy the symbolic speech test.
The second element involves scrutiny of the effectiveness
of the means; the regulation must be an effective means to
"further" the government's interest." 4 Again, O'Brien sug-
gests that this test is not very demanding. There the Court
held that a ban on destroying draft cards "substantially fur-
thers the smooth and proper functioning of the [draft] sys-
330. A detailed discussion of the delegated power limit on the federal govern-
ment is beyond the scope of this article. In general, the limit is met if the pur-
pose of the regulation is arguably related to a delegated power and the regulation
is arguably an effective means for furthering that purpose.
331. O'Biien, 391 U.S. at 377.
332. Cf Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (discussing the
substantial government interest test in the context of commercial speech). See infra
note 365 and accompanying text.
333. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
334. 391 U.S. at 381 ("substantially furthers").
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tern"33 5 even though the ban added almost nothing to the al-
ready existing requirement that registrants keep their draft
cards in their possession.
3 6
iii. Interest unrelated to suppress-
ing expression?
The third part of the O'Brien test requires that "the gov-
ernmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression."3 7 The Court considers this test to be basically the
same as the test for distinguishing between content-based and
content-neutral infringements.33 8 In this regard, the main
point stressed in O'Brien is that the government interest must
be "limited to the noncommunicative impact of ... [the] con-
duct."339 Conversely, the government's focus on the "commu-
nicative impact" of flag burning was the key to the Court's
decision to use strict scrutiny rather than the O'Brien test, and
strike down the Texas and federal flag destruction laws in Tex-
as v. Johnson 4° and United States v. Eichman.341
Determining whether regulations of symbolic speech are
related to suppressing free speech (content-based) or unrelated
335. Id.
336. If the symbolic speech test is the same as the time, place, or manner
test, as the Court says it is, then this mid- level effectiveness scrutiny is the very
deferential "better than nothing test" enunciated in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781 (1989). See supra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
337. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). This is the crucial
'switching question" that controls whether the analysis will proceed on track one,
with its strong presumption of unconstitutionality, or on track two, with its
mid-level presumption of unconstitutionality. "This passage is the foundation of
the widely discussed two-track justification analysis associated with O'Brien .
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1220 n.2 (1991).
338. E.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298
(1984).
339. O'Biien, 391 U.S. at 381-82. The Court stressed the "noncommunicative
impact" theme repeatedly. Id. at 382 ("noncommunicative impact of his conduct";
'regulation of noncommunicative conduct"; "condemns only the independent
noncommunicative impact of conduct"; "noncommunicative impact of O'Brien's act
of burning his registration certificate").
340. 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989) ("Whether Johnson's treatment of the flag
violated Texas law thus depended on the likely communicative impact of his
expressive conduct.").
341. 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990) ("[T]he Act still suffers from the same
fundamental flaw: it suppresses expression out of concern for its likely communi-
cative impact.").
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(content-neutral) is not easy. For example, the Court's conclu-
sion in O'Brien, namely that the federal statute banning de-
struction of draft cards was not related to suppressing free
speech, has been widely criticized in light of Congress' appar-
ent purpose to single out Vietnam War protesters. 4 Similar-
ly, the basic strategy of the drafters of the Federal Flag De-
struction Act of 1990 was to make the statute content-neutral
by omitting all references to audience reaction, but the Court,
by a 54 margin, concluded that the government's purpose was
related to the suppression of free expression and that the stat-
ute was therefore subject to strict rather than mid-level scruti-
ny.3 43
If the infringement is related to suppressing speech, the
O'Brien test is not met, and the regulation is unconstitutional
unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny or some other
applicable first amendment test. If, on the other hand, the
infringement is unrelated to suppressing speech, one should
continue with the O'Brien analysis.
iv. Restriction no greater than
essential?
O'Brien's fourth part is a form of means scrutiny that in-
volves analysis of available alternatives and requires that "the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than essential to the furtherance- of [the
government's] interest."3 4 4 The wording of this test made it
initially seem identical to the least-restrictive-alternative test
used in strict scrutiny cases, but its application has belied this
appearance. In O'Brien, for example, the ban on destruction of
342. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 376 F.2d 538, 541 (1st Cir. 1967),
which stated: "We would be closing our eyes . . . if we did not see on the face
of the amendment that it was precisely directed at public as distinguished from
private destruction . . . . In singling out persons engaging in protest for special
treatment the amendment strikes at the very core of what the First Amendment
protects."
343. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). Cf. Barnes v. Glen The-
ater, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), in which three justices contended that Indiana's ban
on nude dancing is "unrelated to the suppression of free expression," while four
justices asserted that the purpose is to protect consenting adults from the "harm-
ful messages" that nude dancing communicates and that strict scrutiny is therefore
applicable. Id. at 2462, 2473.
344. O'Btien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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draft cards was not really necessary in light of the pre-existing
requirement that registrants keep their draft cards in their
possession. The Court virtually conceded this point when it
labelled the two requirements "alternative statutory avenues of
prosecution to assure the effective protection of one and the
same interest. ""' Recent Supreme Court pronouncements
indicate that the O'Brien test is identical to the test used in
time, place, and manner cases. 46 If this is true, then the re-
quirement is merely that the means be "narrowly tailored,"
that is, not "substantially broader than necessary."47
(c) Comparison of symbolic speech and
time, place, or manner tests
Since the Court has indicated that the O'Brien test is basi-
cally the same as the test for time, place, and manner regula-
tions, 4 lawyers confronted by symbolic speech cases could
presumably structure the analysis along the lines suggested in
either case. The Court has generally chosen to use the O'Brien
rather than the Rock Against Racism formulation in symbolic
speech cases, so an analysis based on that decision is probably
the safest bet. But a brief comparison of the two tests may be
in order.
The tests are certainly quite similar. The first requirement
of time, place and manner analysis-content neutrality-corre-
sponds to the third O'Brien requirement, namely that the gov-
ernment interest be unrelated to suppressing free speech. The
345. Id. at 380.
346. See supra note 328.
347. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
348. "[T]he four-factor standard .. . for validating a regulation of expressive
conduct ... in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard ap-
plied to time, place, or manner restrictions." Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984). Indeed, the test for time, place, and man-
ner regulations is, if anything, a little stricter than the symbolic speech test.
Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions are valid even though
they directly limit oral or written expression. It would be odd to
insist on a higher standard for limitations aimed at regulable conduct
and having only an incidental impact on speech. Thus, if the time,
place, or manner restriction on expressive sleeping ... sufficiently
and narrowly serves a substantial enough governmental interest to
escape First Amendment condemnation, it is untenable to invalidate it
under O'Bfien . ...
Id. at 298 n.8.
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second time, place and manner requirement-that the regula-
tion be narrowly tailored to further a significant government
interest-corresponds to the second and fourth O'Brien re-
quirements, namely that the regulation further a substantial
government interest and not be substantially broader than
necessary. On the other hand, the two tests are not identical.
The third time, place and manner requirement-that alterna-
tive channels be available for the communication-is not includ-
ed in O'Brien. Also, the first O'Brien requirement-that the reg-
ulation be "within the constitutional power of the Govern-
ment"-is not a formal part of the time, place and manner test;
although, it is independently required by the delegated powers
limit on the federal government.
(2) Other speech-plus cases
Problems involving incidental infringements of free speech
resulting from government regulation of physical conduct
brigaded with speech arise in many different contexts. Mass
demonstrations, for example, involve speech (chanting, carry-
ing signs, passing out handbills) plus nonverbal conduct
(marching on public streets, sitting in on government proper-
ty). 49 In such cases, since words are part of the communica-
tive activity, free speech is plainly implicated and there is no
need to apply the Spence test to determine whether first
amendment restrictions apply. Otherwise, the analysis is the
same as in symbolic speech cases, and one should use the
O'Brien test. Thus, such regulations are constitutional if they
are within the government's constitutional power, designed to
further a substantial government interest, unrelated to sup-
pressing free speech, and no broader than necessary to further
the government's interest. 50
c) Commercial speech
Most commercial speech is protected by the first amend-
ment.3 5' However, the protection is reduced to approximate-
349. Labor picketing involves similar combinations of verbal and nonverbal
conduct.
350. Mass demonstrations may also involve issues concerning fighting words,
clear and present danger, time-place-manner regulations, prior restraints, etc.
351. At one time, commercial speech was outside the first amendment. Valen-
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ly the same level as in time, place, manner and speech-plus cas-
es, 52 because commercial speech is less easily chilled and
more easily verified than political speech and other kinds of
speech that are fully protected. 53 In applying commercial
speech analysis, one must determine first whether the speech
in question is commercial. If so, the four-part Central Hudson
test applies. 54 Part one of the Central Hudson test asks
whether the commercial speech is misleading or solely con-
cerned with illegal activity. If so, it is not protected, and thus
rationality review is used. 55 If the commercial speech is not
misleading or solely concerned with illegal activity, the remain-
ing three parts of the Central Hudson test apply. The respon-
dent must prove that its infringement directly advances a sub-
stantial government interest, and that its infringement is not
substantially broader than necessary to serve the government
interest.356 If this test is met, even content-based restrictions
on commercial speech are allowed; content neutrality is not re-
quired.
(1) Commercial speech?
The threshold question in commercial speech analysis is
whether the speech respondent infringed is commercial
tine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). But that rule was changed by Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976), which held that commercial speech is protected by the first amendment,
although not as completely as political speech.
352. In their earliest versions, the components of the commercial speech test
involving means-end scrutiny seemed rather strict, comparable to the "intermediate
scrutiny" used in equal protection cases involving gender-based classifications.
Recent cases, however, have watered down the scrutiny to the same level as the
rather deferential mid-level scrutiny described in the prior two sections. The
current test requires only a substantial government interest, deferential effective-
ness scrutiny, and means that are not substantially broader than necessary.
353. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). Commercial speech is less easily chilled because it is driven
by the profit motive. It is more easily verified because the speech is about tle
speaker's own product and the speaker therefore has the best access to informa-
tion about the subject matter. Id. at 772 n.24.
354. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
355. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
356. In other words, Central Hudson sets up a two-track analysis, with part one
of the four-part test acting as the switching question.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
speech. As stated before, 57 if the sole purpose of the speech
is to propose a commercial transaction, the speech is commer-
cial speech."' 8 Speech which proposes a commercial transac-
tion and also communicates other protected information is
commercial speech when the commercial proposal is not "inex-
tricably intertwined" with the noncommercial speech, 5 9 or
perhaps when the speech is an advertisement which refers to a
specific product and is economically motivated. 6° If the
speech does not satisfy at least one of these tests, the commer-
cial speech analysis ends, and one must analyze the infringe-
ment under some other line of first amendment law. If the
speech in question is commercial speech, the Central Hudson
test applies.
(2) Central Hudson test
Central Hudson 6' established a four-part test which fo-
cuses on: (1) whether the speech is misleading or concerned
solely with illegal activity; (2) whether the government has a
"substantial" interest in restricting the speech; (3) "whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest;" and
(4) "whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest."
3 62
(a) Is the commercial speech mislead-
ing or solely concerned with illegal activity?
The first part of the test asks whether the commercial
speech is misleading3 63 or solely concerned with an illegal
transaction. If so, the speech is unprotected by the first amend-
357. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
358. Vitginia State Bd. of Phaimacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (speech which does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction") (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)), quoted with ap-
proval in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986),
and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
359. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989).
360. Bolget; 463 U.S. at 67. See supra note 101.
361. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
362. Id. at 566.
363. Commercial speech is "misleading" if it is false, actually misled someone,
or is "inherently misleading," i.e., substantially likely to mislead the audience. E.g.,
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1978).
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ment and rationality review applies. 64 If not, the speech is
protected by the first amendment, and the remaining three
parts of the Central Hudson test apply. The next three sections
assume that the commercial speech is not misleading or solely
concerned with illegal activity.
(b) Does the government have a
substantial interest in regulating the speech?
The second part of the Central Hudson test involves some-
what intensified end scrutiny. It requires respondent to prove
that the restriction on commercial speech is designed to serve
a "substantial" interest. The interest must be constitutionally
permissible. It must have been the government's actual pur-
pose rather than one dreamed up by an attorney or judge after
the fact. Also, it must be "substantial," i.e., somewhat stronger
than the bare "legitimate" interest that suffices to satisfy ratio-
nality review.3 65 The Court has occasionally rejected govern-
ment interests as insufficiently substantial to support restric-
tions on commercial speech.366
(c) Does the regulation "directly
advance" the government's interest?
The third part of the Central Hudson test involves mildly
intensified means scrutiny. It requires that the means chosen
be effective in furthering the government's interest. As the
Court put it in Central Hudson: "[T]he restriction must directly
advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for
the government's purpose. "367
364. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
365. E.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) ("There [in the
rational basis test] it suffices if the law could be thought to further a legitimate
governmental goal . . . . Here we require the government goal to be substan-
tial . . ").
366. E.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
(interest in not disclosing terms of attorney's contingent fee contract not substan-
tial); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (interest in suppress-
ing offensive advertisements not substantial because the audience was not captive).
367. 447 U.S. at 564.
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As originally formulated, the "directly advances" test
seemed to be identical to the substantially effective means re-
quirement of strict scrutiny, and it was used in several cases to
strike down restrictions on commercial speech. 6 However,
this component of the analysis has been weakened by recent
cases. Posadas de Puerto Rico,36 9 for example, suggested that
the "third prong of Central Hudson test [is] satisfied where [the]
legislative judgment [is] not manifestly unreasonable.""' Sim-
ilarly, Fox requires only that the means be "narrowly tailored"
and that courts defer to the judgment of the branch of govern-
ment imposing the restriction. 7 ' This may mean that the
Rock Against Racism deferential "better than nothing test" 72
will be imported into commercial speech law, and that effec-
tiveness scrutiny will be watered down to little more than ratio-
nality review.
(d) Is the restriction "more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest?"
The fourth part of the Central Hudson test also involves
means scrutiny, and requires that the government action be no
more restrictive than necessary. In its original form, this test
had a good deal of bite. Indeed, it seemed identical to the
368. E.g., Bolgei; 463 U.S. at 60 (ban on mailing unsolicited contraception ads
does not directly advance parents' interest in controlling education of children);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(ban on promotional advertising by public utility does not directly advance interest
in fair rate structure).
369. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
370. Id. at 342 (quoting Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
509 (1981)). The Court went on to find that Puerto Rico's ban on casino advertis-
ing satisfies the "directly advances" test despite admitted under-inclusiveness.
371. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) ("What our decisions
require is ...a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Within
those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner
of regulation may best be employed.").
372. See supra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
373. Part four of Central Hudson has resulted in the invalidation of numerous
restrictions on commercial speech. E.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplin-
ary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990) (ban on letterhead stating that attorney is a
certified trial specialist); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (ban
on targeted direct-mail solicitation by attorney); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (ban on self-recommendation and drawings in
attorney ads); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (restrictions on ads listing
attorney's areas of practice and on attorney's professional announcement cards);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (ban on newspaper ads re prices of rou-
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"least onerous means" requirement of strict scrutiny. However,
the Fox case rejected that requirement374 and adopted the
softer "narrowly tailored" test, stating: "[W]e have not insisted
that there be no conceivable alternative, but only that the regu-
lation not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary
to further the government's legitimate interest.' "s75
The language of recent cases weakening the Central Hud-
son test suggests that scrutiny of restrictions on commercial
speech has eroded to nothing more than rationality review.
But the Court denies this. As the Court put it in Fox:
We reject the contention that the test we have described is
overly permissive. It is far different, of course, from the
"rational basis" test .... There it suffices if the law could
be thought to further a legitimate governmental goal, with-
out reference to whether it does so at inordinate cost.
Here we require the government goal to be substantial,
and the cost to be carefully calculated. Moreover, since the
State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, . . . it
must affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we re-
quire. 7 6
Despite this disclaimer, however, the Court has insisted that
the Central Hudson test be applied in a manner that preserves
"ample scope of regulatory authority." 77
If respondent satisfies the four-part Central Hudson test,
the infringement of commercial speech is constitutional and
claimant loses. If not, claimant wins.
tine legal services); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (ban on promotional advertising by public utility); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (ban
on ads of prices of prescription drugs).
374. "Whatever the conflicting tenor of our prior dicta may be, we now focus
upon this specific issue for the first time, and conclude that the reason of the
matter requires something short of a least-restrictive-means standard." Fox, 492 U.S.
at 477.
375. Fox, 492 U.S. at 478 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 799 (1989)). Later in its opinion, the Fox Court adopted the Rock Against
Racism test for commercial speech cases.
376. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citation omitted).
377. Id. at 477.
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d) Communication-restricting regulations of
electronic media
Restrictions on electronic broadcasting are subject to mid-
level means-end scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, because
special characteristics of electronic media justify somewhat
greater restrictions than are appropriate in other contexts. The
special characteristics are that electronic broadcasting invades
the privacy of the home and is accessible to children. 78 In
order to protect electronic broadcasting while also furthering
the interests in protecting privacy and children, the Court has
held that restrictions on broadcasting must be "narrowly tai-
lored to further a substantial governmental interest." '379 This
test, referred to as the League of Women Voters test, involves
mid- level means-end scrutiny which is less intense than strict
scrutiny but more intense than rationality review.
(1) Restrictions on communications via
electronic broadcasting?
To determine whether the League of Women Voters test
applies, one must first determine whether the government
regulation concerns electronic broadcasting and restricts the
flow of communications to the audience. In the first place, the
test only applies to electronic broadcasting media such as radio
and television, since those media share the special characteris-
tics which justify less than strict scrutiny. Moreover, the test
only applies when the government regulation restricts the flow
of communications to the audience.3 80 If these two require-
ments are met, the League of Women Voters test applies.
378. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). Another special
characteristic, "spectrum scarcity," is relevant when the government enacts regula-
tions designed to enhance communications to the audience. That characteristic,
however, is not relevant when the government restricts electronic communications.
379. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380.
380. If the regulation enhances the flow of communications to the radio or
television audience, it is subject to the softer Red Lion test. See infra notes 441-44
and accompanying text.
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(2) Is the regulation "narrowly tailored to
further a substantial governmental interest?"
The League of Women Voters test appears to be identical to
the mid-level means-end scrutiny used in time, place and man-
ner cases, speech-plus cases, and commercial speech cases. It
requires respondent to prove that the restriction on electronic
broadcasting is supported by a government interest that is
(1) permissible, (2) substantial, and (3) actual rather than mere-
ly speculative or hypothetical. ss  If so, respondent must
prove that the restriction effectively furthers that interest and
that the restriction is not substantially more burdensome than
necessary.
In FCC v. League of Women Voters,ss2 the Court held that
the FCC's ban on political editorials by stations receiving PBS
funds was unconstitutional. The interest in preventing exces-
sive government influence over public broadcasting could be
served by less restrictive means. Moreover, regulating editorial
speech by station management was too over- and
under-inclusive to be an effective means for preventing private
groups from using public broadcasting to propagate their
views.
e) Prisoners' outgoing correspondence
In Procunier v. Martinez, ss the Court held that restric-
tions on prisoners' outgoing personal correspondence are also
subject to mid-level means-end scrutiny. As the Court put it:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further
an important or substantial governmental interest unrelat-
ed to the suppression of expression .... Second, the limi-
tation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the par-
ticular governmental interest involved. 84
This test is structurally the same as the other tests discussed in
this section,8 5 but it may be applied more deferentially, be-
381. Again, this assertion is based on the general rule that intensified end
scrutiny involves all these components.
382. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
383. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
384. Id. at 413-14.
385. To avoid undue repetition, the components of this test will not be
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cause the judiciary is "ill equipped" to deal with the difficult
and delicate problems of prison management. 8 6 In Procunier,
the Court struck down a system for censoring prisoners' corre-
spondence, finding that respondent failed to satisfy mid-level
387scrutiny.
This completes the discussion of free speech cases using
mid-level means-end scrutiny. The next section discusses free
speech cases using rationality review.
3) Infringements subject to rationality review
Some infringements of protected speech are subject to
rationality review, the least intense version of means-end scruti-
ny. The ensuing sections discuss four such infringements: regu-
lation of speech in nonpublic forums owned or controlled by
the government, regulation of communications to prisoners,
regulation of "disfavored" speech, and communication-
enhancing regulation of electronic broadcasting.
a) Regulation of speech in nonpublic forums
owned or controlled by the government
The government may regulate speech in government-
owned or controlled nonpublic forums if the regulations are
point-of-view neutral and satisfy rationality review.388 To ap-
ply this strand of first amendment law, one must determine
whether the property in question is a government-owned or
controlled nonpublic forum and, if so, whether the regulation
satisfies the neutrality and rationality requirements.
spelled out separately here.
386. Procuniet; 416 U.S. At 404-05.
387. At one time, it appeared that the Piocunier test might apply generally to
infringements of prisoners' free speech rights, but later cases confined Prycunier to
regulations of outgoing correspondence and adopted a specialized version of
nondeferential rationality review for prison restrictions on incoming correspon-
dence and publications. See iifra notes 412-20 and accompanying text.
388. E.g., United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3121-22 (1990); Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
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(1) Government-owned or controlled
nonpublic forum?
(a) Government-owned or controlled?
The first requirement for application of nonpublic forum
law is that the property in question be government proper-
ty."' The basic idea is that the government needs substantial
latitude to assure that its property is used for its primary pur-
poses and is not disrupted by extraneous speech-related activi-
ties. The requirement is met, of course, if the government
owns the property.39 In addition, the requirement is met if
the property, although privately owned, is controlled by the
government. Thus, for example, the Court applied nonpublic
forum law in evaluating regulation of residential mail boxes
owned by private persons but controlled by the Postal Ser-
vice.39'
(b) Nonpublic forum?
If the property in question is government-owned or con-
trolled, one must next ask whether the property is a nonpublic
forum. As the name suggests, a nonpublic forum is govern-
ment property that is not a public forum. To apply this rule,
one must define what a public forum is and then determine
whether the government property in question fits that defini-
tion. If not, the property is a nonpublic forum.
The Supreme Court's cases divide public forums into two
main categories, traditional and designated.3 92 A traditional
public forum is a street, park, or other property that "pos-
389. See cases cited supra note 388.
390. E.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (workplaces in federal buildings); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (intra-school mail
system).
391. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114 (1981).
392. E.g., Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119; Pety, 460 U.S. at 45. In short, the
Court has adopted a "tripartite framework for determining how first amendment
interests are to be analyzed with respect to Government property." Kokinda, 110 S.
Ct. at 3119. The property may be a traditional public forum, a designated public
forum, or a nonpublic forum. The rules for traditional and designated public
forums are similar; the rules for nonpublic forums are quite different. "Limited
public forums" are a subcategory of designated public forums.
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sess[es] all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other tradi-
tional public forums."393 Apparently, the main attribute of
traditional public forums is that "time out of mind, [they] have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions." 94 Public
thoroughfares such as streets and sidewalks are "the archetype
of a traditional public forum." 95 "No particularized inquiry
into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all pub-
lic streets are ... traditional public fora."3 96 The same is true
for public sidewalks as well.397 But not all streets and side-
walks are public thoroughfares.39" A particularized inquiry is
necessary, for example, for sidewalks built specially to provide
access to public buildings, and relevant factors may include the
location and purpose of the sidewalk399 and perhaps the "ob-
jective characteristics of Government property and its custom-
ary use by the public." °°
A designated public forum is government property that is
not a traditional public forum but that has been opened for
indiscriminate communicative use by all or a segment of the
population.4"' Government property that is not a traditional
public forum will be viewed as a nonpublic forum unless claim-
ant shows a "clear intent to create a public forum."402 The
government does not abandon nonforum status merely by
permitting selective access to speakers for communications,
393. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988).
394. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939), quoted
with approval in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988).
395. Frsby, 487 U.S. at 480.
396. Id. at 481.
397. E.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
398. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) (sidewalk "constructed
solely to assist postal patrons to negotiate the space between the parking lot and
front door of the post office" is not a traditional public forum).
399. Id. at 3120-21 (plurality opinion).
400. Id. at 3125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
401. "Hence, school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if
school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for
indiscriminate use by the general public,' . . . or by some segment of the public,
such as student organizations." Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 267 (1988).
402. Id. at 270; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985). Accord Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121, which also suggests that
claimant must show that the property was "expressly dedicated to . . . expressive
activity."
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especially communications related to the property's primary
purposes.' 3
If the property is not owned or controlled by the govern-
ment or is a public forum, nonpublic forum law is inapplicable
and one should analyze the infringement using strict scrutiny,
mid-level time-place-manner scrutiny, or some other appropri-
ate set of first amendment rules. If, as the next section
assumes, the property is a government-owned or controlled
nonpublic forum, the regulation should be analyzed using the
Court's two-part requirement of point-of-view neutrality and
rationality.
(2) Compliance with neutrality and ratio-
nality tests?
(a) Point-of-view neutrality?
Regulations of speech in nonpublic forums normally run
afoul of the first amendment unless they are point-of-view
neutral. 4 In other words, the government may not discrimi-
nate based on the speaker's point of view or bias, even on
government property. This is because point-of-view discrimina-
tion is the essence of censorship. On the other hand, complete
content neutrality is not required. If the regulation is
point-of-view neutral, the government may discriminate on the
basis of subject matter. 5 and identity of the speaker,40 6
bases which would not be allowed if full content-neutrality
were required.
If the government gave access to administration support-
ers and denied access to critics, the point-of-view neutrality re-
quirement would plainly not be satisfied. But the requirement
403. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 47 (1983) ("[S]elective access does not transform government property
into a public forum.").
404. Pei7y, 460 U.S. at 46, 55.
405. E.g., id. at 49; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)
(city-owned bus company may ban "political or public issue advertising" while
permitting commercial advertising); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (army
base may ban political speeches and demonstrations while permitting other
speech-related activities).
406. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). This rule
may apply only to "limited" public forums.
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is not always so easy to apply. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educational Fund,4"' for example, the Court remand-
ed the case for further consideration of the issue whether ex-
clusion of "advocacy groups" was point-of-view neutral or bi-
ased against groups critical of Reagan administration policy.
(b) Rationality?
Point-of-view neutral regulations of speech in nonpublic
forums satisfy the first amendment if rationality review is satis-
fied, i.e., if the regulations arguably further some conceivable
valid government interest.408 For example, the government
may adopt viewpoint-neutral regulations reasonably designed
to "preserve the property under its control for the use to
which it is lawfully designated."4" 9 Viewpoint-neutral regula-
tions of speech in nonpublic forums are presumed to be con-
stitutional, and the burden is on claimant to prove either that
no conceivable valid interest supports the regulation or that
the means chosen could not rationally be viewed as effective.
The Court's opinions suggest that, despite the significant
free speech interests affected, rationality review in nonpublic
forum cases should be deferential. In Cornelius, for example,
the Court found that exclusion of advocacy groups from access
to federal workplaces during the Combined Federal Campaign
was rational because President Reagan "could reasonably con-
clude" that the presence of advocacy groups would disrupt the
campaign.410 And in Perry, the Court said there is no need
for proof that the regulation will effectively further the
government's purpose.
4
'
1
b) Prisoners' incoming communications
Incarceration does not suspend the free speech rights of
prisoners, but it does reduce the level of first amendment
407. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
408. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); United States Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981).
409. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966), quoted with approval in Peny,
460 U.S. at 46.
410. 473 U.S. at 809.
411. 460 U.S. at 52 n.12.
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protections. In Turner v. Safley412  and Thornburgh v.
Abbott4 1 the Court adopted a specialized version of rationali-
ty review as the test for most infringements of prisoners' free
speech rights.414 In general, the test is whether the infringe-
ment is "reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests."415
The rationality review is specialized, however; it requires
the court to focus on four factors. The first factor is "whether
the governmental objective underlying the regulations at issue
is legitimate and neutral, and . . .the regulations are rationally
related to that objective." 416 The second factor is "whether
there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates."4 17 "The third factor ... is the im-
pact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right
will have on others (guards and inmates) in the prison. "418
The fourth factor is whether "an inmate claimant can point to
an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at
de minimis cost to valid penological interests."41 9
Obviously, this is an intensified version of rationality re-
view that requires more probing analysis than the traditional
deferential rational basis test. The Court has stressed that the
test is "not toothless."420
412. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Tuner rejected a challenge to content-based censor-
ship of prisoners' incoming personal correspondence. Censorship of outgoing
correspondence is subject to intensified, mid-level scutiny. See supra notes 383-87
and accompanying text.
413. 490 U.S. 401 (1989). Thornbuigh rejected a facial challenge to federal
prison regulations authorizing prison officials to bar incoming publications "detri-
mental to institutional security." Id. at 403.
414. Cf O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (applying similar
reasonableness test to infringements of prisoners' rights under free exercise
clause).
415. Thornbuigh, 490 U.S. at 404; Tutnet; 482 U.S. at 89.
416. Thornbuigh, 490 U.S. at 414. In this context, "neutral" means that the
government's interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of expression." Id.
417. Thotwbuig, 490 U.S. at 417; Turne, 482 U.S. at 90 (1987).
418. Thornbuigh, 490 U.S. at 418; Turnei; 482 U.S. at 90.
419. Thornbuigh, 490 U.S. at 418; Turne,; 482 U.S. at 90-91.
420. Thornbuugh, 490 U.S. at 414.
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c) Disfavored speech
In general, content-based infringements of protected
speech are subject to strict scrutiny.421 Sometimes, where the
special characteristics of the -speech justify a reduced level of
protection, such infringements are subject to mid-level
means-end scrutiny."' Occasionally, content-based infringe-
ments of protected speech are subject only to rationality re-
view because the nature of the speech and the limited nature
of the infringement justify granting the government wide regu-
latory latitude. One such instance where rationality review ap-
plies involves regulation of so-called "disfavored speech." This
unusual area of free speech law has two branches, one involv-
ing place regulations of adult movie theaters and the other
involving time regulations of profane electronic broadcast-
ing.42 This section discusses the two categories of disfavored
speech.424
(1) Erotic movies
In Young v. American Mini Theatres,4 25 a four-vote plurali-
ty upheld an ordinance banning adult theaters within 1,000
feet of any pool hall, liquor store, bar, pawn shop, or other
similar establishment. The ordinance was facially
content-based, since adult theaters were defined in terms of
the content of the movies the theaters showed.426 Rather
than applying strict scrutiny, however, the Court invented a
new hybrid test apparently involving rationality review coupled
with three additional components, namely a requirement that
421. See supra notes 135-78 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 351-77 and accompanying text discussing commercial
speech and notes 378-82 and accompanying text discussing
communication-restricting regulations of electronic broadcasting.
423. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (broadcasting of massed
sexual and excretory speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (locating adult theaters).
424. Neither body of disfavored-speech law is well settled. Both spring from
plurality opinions that have not been ratified by a majority.
425. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
426. Id. at 53. Under the legal analysis developed in later cases, the infringe-
ment would be deemed content-neutral because the government's purpose was to
regulate the "secondary effects" of the theaters on the surrounding neighborhoods
rather than to suppress erotic movies. See supra notes 142-49, 287-88 and accompa-
nying text.
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the speech be disfavored, that the infringement be "slight,"
and that the government's interest be independent of sup-
pressing speech. The justification for this reduced level of pro-
tection was that "society's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude."4 27
The next four subsections discuss the four parts of the Ameri-
can Mini Theatres test.
(a) Disfavored speech
The first requirement is that the regulated speech be
disfavored. In American Mini Theatres, the Court held that non-
obscene adult movies, while not entirely outside the first
amendment, are disfavored. The only standard enunciated for
determining what kinds of speech are disfavored-that society's
interest in protecting the speech be of a lesser magnitude-is
so vague that it is difficult to tell whether the Court will de-
clare other kinds of speech to be similarly disfavored.
(b) Slight infringement
The second requirement is that the infringement be
"slight."42 This means, of course, that a total ban is not al-
lowed. Moreover, even regulations that do not amount to a
total ban must allow substantial latitude for the regulated
speech. In American Mini Theatres, for example, the regulation
permitted adult theaters showing erotic movies as long as they
were not within 1,000 feet of any regulated business.
(c) Independent government interest
The third requirement is that the regulation be supported
by an "independent government interest," that is an interest
other than hostility toward the category of speech regulat-
ed.4 29 This requirement is essentially the same as O'Brien's in-
dependent government interest requiremeit.43 ° In American
Mini Theatres, the Court held that the government's interest
427. 427 U.S. at 70.
428. Id. at 72 n.35.
429. Id. at 71 n.34.
430. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see supra notes 337-43 and
accompanying text.
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was independent, because the purpose was to prevent the "sec-
ondary effects" of adult theaters on the surrounding neighbor-
hood, especially to prevent the development of a skid row.43 1
(d) Rationality
Finally, the regulation must apparently satisfy rationality
review. The government's independent interest must be consti-
tutionally permissible, and the means must be rationally relat-
ed to the advancement of that interest.43 2
(2) Massed sexual and excretory speech
Similarly, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,43 3 the Court up-
held the FCC's threat to impose sanctions on a radio station
for broadcasting George Carlin's "dirty words" comic routine
during daytime hours. Again, the infringement was facially
content-based, since it was directed at the massed profanity of
Carlin's monologue. Yet the Court applied a multi-pronged
test with components quite similar to those used in American
Mini Theatres.
(a) Disfavored speech
The Court's first premise was that "patently offensive sexu-
al and excretory language" is subject to content-based regula-
tion, because, while "not entirely outside the protection of the
First Amendment,"43 4 such speech is disfavored. Not all sexu-
al and excretory language is subject to this kind of reduced
first amendment scrutiny; the controlling fact was that Carlin's
monologue contained "massed" sexual and excretory lan-
guage.43
5
431. Cf City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). See supra
note 145 and accompanying text.
432. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) ("The record
discloses a factual basis for the . . . conclusion that this kind of restriction will
have the desired effect. It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of its
decision . . . . [T]he city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment
with solutions .... "). This is clearly the language of rationality review.
433. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
434. Id. at 74647.
435. Id. Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (isolated profane utterance
is protected).
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(b) Electronic broadcasting
The plurality's second premise was that Carlin's mono-
logue was subject to more regulation than most protected
speech because it was broadcast over the radio." 6 "[O]f all
forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received
the most limited First Amendment protection."4" 7 This is be-
cause broadcasting invades the privacy of the home and is
"uniquely accessible to children."4 38
(c) Slight infringement
Like American Mini Theatres, Pacifica did not support an
absolute ban on broadcasting Carlin's monologue.4 9 All the
FCC did was require Pacifica to schedule the monologue dur-
ing late night hours. Thus, the case only supports relatively
minor restrictions that leave open alternative channels for the
communication.
(d) Rationality
Although this is not entirely clear, Pacifica also suggests
that regulation of electronic broadcasting of massed sexual and
excretory language must be rational. Thus, such regulations
are unconstitutional if the government has no constitutionally
permissible purpose for regulating them or the regulation is
not rationally related to the government's purpose. This test is
not difficult to meet, however, since the purpose is to protect
children from sexual and excretory language, and moving the
broadcasting to late hours is arguably a rational method for
furthering this purpose.
To invoke Pacifica successfully, respondent must prove
that all four requirements listed above are met. In Sable Com-
munications,44° for example, the Court refused to apply the
436. "The Pacfica opinion also relied on the 'unique' attributes of broadcast-
ing . . . ." Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989).
437. Pacfica, 438 U.S. at 748.
438. Id. at 748-49. Cf supra note 378 and infra notes 441-43 and accompanying
text.
439. "Pacifica . . . did not involve a total ban on broadcasting indecent materi-
al." Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 127.
440. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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Pacifica doctrine, because the FCC's ban on indecent
dial-a-porn messages was not a slight infringement and tele-
phones are less intrusive than radio and TV. Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court struck down the ban.
d) Communication-enhancing regulations of
electronic broadcasting
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,4 4' the Court held
that content-based regulations of electronic broadcasting are
subject only to rationality review if the regulations enhance the
flow of communications to the audience.442 The reduced in-
tensity of judicial scrutiny is justified by special characteristics
of electronic media including "spectrum scarcity" and the fact
that radio and television communications invade the privacy of
the home and are accessible to children. The most important
factor here is spectrum scarcity. Given the limited number of
channels available for radio and television stations; broadcast-
ing frequencies must be assigned selectively and are not avail-
able to all applicants. Because of spectrum scarcity, the right of
the audience is paramount, and the government has greater
regulatory authority than in the case of the print media.44 If
the government regulates in such a way as to increase commu-
nications and does so in a rational manner, the first amend-
ment is satisfied.
Thus, for example, the Court upheld the FCC's "fairness
doctrine" requiring radio and television stations to present
discussions of public issues and allow access for opposing views
and replies to attacks.444 The Court conceded that such regu-
lation is content-based, but held that the appropriate test is ra-
tionality review and that the fairness doctrine is a rational way
to promote radio and television discussion of issues of public
concern.
This completes the discussion of infringements which are
subject to means-end scrutiny. The discussion now turns to
other modes of free speech analysis.
441. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
442. Regulations that restrict the flow of communications from electronic
broadcasting media to their audiences are subject to more exacting, mid-level
means-end scrutiny. See supra notes 378-82 and accompanying text.
443. Cf Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
444. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396.
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b. Infringements subject to tests other than means-end
scrutiny
Although most government infringements of free speech
are evaluated by using means-end scrutiny (strict scrutiny,
mid-level scrutiny, or rationality review), other tests are used as
well. This section discusses several contexts in which the Court
uses formulae other than means-end scrutiny to evaluate
respondent's compliance with the first amendment. These tests
include the clear and present danger test, the actual malice test
and other tests used in defamation cases, and tests used for
speech by government employees.
At the outset, it should be noted that these cases involve
content-based infringements of protected speech.445 For his-
torical and practical reasons, however, they are exceptions to
the general rule that content-based infringements of protected
speech are subject to strict scrutiny.446
1) Speech subject to clear and present danger tests
At least three categories of speech are protected by clear
and present danger tests. They include incitement of illegal
acts, incitement of violent audience responses, and communi-
cations threatening obstruction of court proceedings. The next
three subsections will discuss these categories of clear and
present danger analysis.
a) Incitement of illegal acts
The government usually may not punish protected speech
that incites illegal acts unless the incitement/clear and present
445. One could argue, based on statements in Supreme Court opinions, that if
the tests discussed in this section are met, the speech is outside the first amend-
ment. For example, several cases suggest that incitement that creates a clear and
present danger of illegal acts is unprotected, even in the context of political
speech. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228 (1961) ("It was settled in
Dennis that the advocacy with which we are here concerned is not constitutionally
protected speech . . . ."). Similarly, several cases suggest that defamation is unpro-
tected if the actual malice test and other applicable tests are met. But the better
view is that these communications are protected by the first amendment. Indeed,
the first amendment protects them precisely by requiring proof of clear and
present danger, actual malice, etc.
446. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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danger test is met.447 Purely criminal speech, the sole pur-
pose of which is to incite criminal acts, is not protected and
may be punished if rationality review is met.448 Incitement of
illegal acts is protected by the first amendment, however, if the
speech is "bifarious," i.e., if the purpose to incite illegal acts is
accompanied by some other legitimate purpose such as the
purpose to protest the political status quo and bring about
political reform. 449  This discussion focuses on bifarious
speech, especially so-called subversive speech.450
In a long series of famous cases, including some of the
earliest landmarks of free speech law, the Supreme Court has
held that speech inciting illegal acts, including the forcible
overthrow of the government, may not be punished unless a
rather complex test is met requiring respondent to prove that
the speaker intentionally incited illegal acts in a context creat-
ing a danger of serious harm.45' Several of these cases, in-
cluding the most recent cases in the line, also require incite-
ment and likelihood of imminent illegal acts.452 Others sug-
gest that in some cases neither incitement of immediate acts
nor likelihood of immediate harm is required. 45 The next
two subsections discuss these two versions of the incite-
ment/clear and present danger test.
447. E.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
448. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
449. E.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 502 ("[T]he teaching and advocacy of the over-
throw of the Government by force and violence . . . even though coupled with
the intent to accomplish that overthrow, contains an element of speech.").
450. From here on, "incitement of illegal acts" will be used as a shorthand to
refer to bifarious speech rather than pure criminal speech.
451. Relevant cases include Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis, 341 U.S. at 494; Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
452. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969).
453. Yates, 354 U.S. at 334; Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509.
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(1) The Brandenburg-Hess incitement/clear
and present danger test
In most cases, bifarious speech inciting illegal acts may not
be punished unless the government satisfies the Brandenburg-
Hess test by showing that the speaker intentionally incited
imminent illegal acts thereby creating a likelihood that such
acts would occur and would cause serious harm. In its classic
statement of this test, the Court said:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advoca-
cy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.45
A few years later, the Court reaffirmed this test, stating that
the government may not punish incitement of illegal acts
unless the "words were intended to produce, and likely to pro-
duce, imminent disorder."455 The Brandenburg-Hess test has at
least five elements, all of which must be proved by respondent.
(a) Incitement of illegal acts
First, respondent must prove that the speaker incited "law-
less action."456 The classic case on this point is Yates v. United
States,457 which stressed that "advocacy directed at promoting
unlawful action" is required and that "advocacy of abstract
doctrine" is not enough. 45 "The essential distinction is that
those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do
something ... rather than merely to believe in something."
459
The jury decides whether this requirement is met, subject to
independent review by appellate judges.
454. Brandenbuig, 395 U.S. at 447.
455. Hess, 414 U.S. at 109 (emphasis in original).
456. Brandenbui, 395 U.S. at 447 ("advocacy . . . directed to inciting...
lawless action") (emphasis added).
457. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
458. Id. at 318. Yates involved interpretation of the Smith Act rather than the
first amendment, but the Court later constitutionalized the distinction between
advocacy of abstract doctrine and incitement of acts in cases such as Brandenbuig
and Hess.
459. Yates, 354 U.S. at 324-25 (emphasis in original).
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(b) Incitement of imminent acts
Second, respondent must prove that the speaker incited
"imminent" lawless action. As the Court put it in Brandenburg,
advocacy may not be punished unless "such advocacy is direct-
ed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action. "460 Thus,
incitement of illegal acts in the remote future is not sufficient
to satisfy the Brandenburg-Hess test. For example, a campus
anti-war demonstrator could not be punished for saying, "We'll
take the fucking street later."46 "[A]t worst, it amounted to
nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite
future time."462 The jury decides whether this requirement is
met, subject to independent appellate review.
(c) Likelihood of imminent harm
Third, respondent must prove the speech was likely to
produce immediate illegal action. This is the heart of the
"clear and present danger" requirement. It is not enough that
the speech was intended to incite immediate illegal action; the
speech must be "likely to incite or produce such action."463
The judge is required to decide whether the likelihood require-
ment is met.
464
(d) Likelihood of serious harm
Fourth, respondent must prove that the harm threatened
was serious.465 Inciting someone to walk on the grass in viola-
460. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added). Cf
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) ("words intended to produce...
imminent disorder") (emphasis in original).
461. Hess, 414 U.S. at 107.
462. Id. at 108.
463. Brandenbuig 395 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added). Cf Hess, 414 U.S. at 109
("likely to produce, imminent disorder") (emphasis added).
464. Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-44 (1978);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 513 (1951).
465. E.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508 (1951) ("We first note that many of the
cases in which this Court has reversed convictions by use of this or similar tests
have been based on the fact that the interest which the State was attempting to
protect was itself too insubstantial to warrant restriction of speech."); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1942) ("[T]he substantive evil must be extremely
serious . . . before utterances can be punished."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
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tion of a "Stay Off the Grass" sign would presumably not suf-
fice. The judge must decide this issue as well.
(e) Intent to incite imminent, illegal
acts
Fifth, respondent must prove that the speaker intended to
incite imminent, illegal acts.466 The Court has not always dis-
cussed this point at length. In Brandenburg the Court merely
required that the "advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action."4 67 Similarly, Yates referred to "ad-
vocacy found to be directed to action. 4 68 Hess, however, ex-
plicitly required proof that the "words were intended to pro-
duce.., imminent disorder."4 69 A somewhat more detailed
discussion appears in Dennis.47°
(2) The Dennis-Yates incitement/clear and
present danger test
In Dennis v. United States,47' a plurality of four Justices
reinterpreted the clear and present danger test, eliminating the
imminence requirement-i.e., the requirement that the speaker
incite imminent illegal acts and that imminent illegal acts be
likely-at least in cases where the harm threatened is extremely
serious. Dennis rejected a facial first amendment challenge to
the Smith Act, which prohibits advocacy of the forcible over-
throw of the U.S. government, organizing a group to so advo-
cate, and conspiracy to achieve the same ends. The plurality
purported to apply the clear and present danger test, but actu-
ally revised it substantially,472 limiting the original version of
the test to cases involving "a comparatively isolated event, bear-
357, 378 (1927) ("serious injury to the State") (Brandeis, J., concurring). Cf
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("likely to produce a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public incon-
venience, annoyance, or unrest").
466. E.g., Brandenbuig, 395 U.S. at 448; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
320 (1957); Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505.
467. 395 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
468. 354 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added).
469. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (emphasis added).
470. 341 U.S. at 499-500.
471. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
472. The revision has been labelled a "near trashing" of the test. J. BARRON &
C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 290 (2d ed. 1991).
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ing little relation ... to any substantial threat to the safety of
the community."4 7' Adopting a new version of the test for
cases involving the world-wide communist movement, the plu-
rality stated, "[i]n each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger."4 74 This new "balancing" version of the test, dispensed
with the strict requirement of imminence in cases where the
harm threatened is very severe.
Perhaps the Dennis test is not good law. It was only a plu-
rality opinion, and it has arguably been superseded by
Brandenburg and Hess, which appear to reinstate the strict re-
quirement of imminence. But this is not clear. It is possible
that the current Supreme Court, if confronted with a highly
complex case involving an extremely serious threat, might
reinstate the Dennis test and limit the Brandenburg-Hess test to
cases involving "relatively isolated events. 475
Since the Court may reactivate the Dennis test, it is worth-
while spelling out its components briefly. The first three com-
ponents of the test are identical to components of the
Brandenburg-Hess test; the fourth component is new; the two
Brandenburg-Hess requirements concerning imminence are de-
leted.
473. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
474. Id. This test was adopted verbatim from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
the Second Circuit.
475. Id. One reason the Court might reactivate Dennis is that the clear and
present danger test requires judges to predict whether speech is likely to produce
future illegal action. When the incitement concerns an isolated event such as a
street-corner speech or a Ku Klux Klan rally, the judges may be able to predict
with some accuracy. But when the speech concerns a highly complex, wide-ranging
conspiracy, prediction of future danger is beyond judicial competence. Further, the
current Court is very conservative, more like the McCarthy-Era Vinson Court than
the liberal-activist Warren Court, and the Dennis test provides greater scope for
government efforts to control subversion and protect the national interest. If the
Court does reactivate the Dennis test, it will probably use that test in cases involv-
ing some configuration of the following factors, which were present in Dennis:
very grave danger such as a serious attempt to overthrow the U.S. government;
complex facts which make it impossible for courts to predict the likelihood that
the threat will materialize; congressional findings that the threat is sufficiently
serious to require punishment of speech; clandestine conspiracy using secret
speech that cannot be rebutted in the marketplace of ideas; and an international
conspiracy dominated by foreign power.
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(a) Incitement of illegal acts
The speaker must urge listeners to do something, rather
than merely to believe something.476 As recognized in Dennis
and further clarified in Yates, a distinction is drawn between
punishable advocacy of action and unpunishable advocacy of
abstract doctrine.
(b) Threat of serious harm
The harm threatened must be serious.477 Indeed, if the
harm threatened is not extremely serious, it will not justify
suspending the normal Brandenburg-Hess test with its strict re-
quirement of imminence.
(c) Intent to incite illegal acts
Both Dennis and Yates require respondent to prove that
the speaker intended to incite illegal acts.478 It is not enough
that the speaker unintentionally said something likely to pro-
duce illegal acts; the speaker must wish or know that illegal
acts will likely result.
(d) Gravity of evil discounted by im-
probability justifies infringement offree speech
This is Learned Hand's test, which was adopted by the
plurality in Dennis. Here is the key language again: "In each
case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."479 This compo-
nent requires the court to determine how serious the threat-
ened harm is and how probable it is that the threat will materi-
alize, and then to weigh the two and determine whether the
need justifies the harm to first amendment interests. This is
obviously a difficult and subjective standard, one that will re-
476. This is the same as part one of the Brandenbuirg-Hess test. See supra notes
456-59 and accompanying text.
477. This is the same as part four of the Brandenbug-Hess test. See supra note
465 and accompanying text.
478. See supra note 466.
479. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
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quire careful analysis by law students, lawyers, and judges if
the Dennis test is adopted.
b) Incitement of audience violence
Another version of the clear and present danger test ap-
plies when the government seeks to punish a speaker for incit-
ing a violent audience response.4 80 This is a common prob-
lem addressed by statutes prohibiting inciting riots and disor-
derly conduct. The Court has indicated that the clear and pres-
ent danger test applies in this context,48' but the test is dif-
ferent from the Brandenburg-Hess and Dennis versions in one
key feature: there is no requirement that the speaker urge the
audience to do something. Quite the contrary, in this context
the usual danger is not that the audience will do what the
speaker advocates but that the audience will be sufficiently
offended by the speech to attack the speaker or sufficiently
divided by the speech to attack each other. In other words, the
kind of "incitement" here is quite different from
Brandenburg-Hess incitement, the speaker is punished not for
inciting the audience to do something but for arousing vio-
lence in a hostile audience. 482 The test involves several com-
ponents.
(1) Intent to cause violent response
The Feiner clear and present danger test requires that the
speaker intend the communication to trigger disorder in the
audience.483 In this case, it is probably sufficient for respon-
dent to prove that the speaker had "knowledge" that a violent
audience response was about to occur; "purpose" is probably
not required.
480. The leading cases on this issue include Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
481. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320; Teininiello, 337 U.S. at 4. The "fighting words"
doctrine, see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text, was not applicable in these
cases, because the communications were not directed at particular individuals.
482. If the danger is that the audience will do what the speaker urges, then
the Brandenbutg.Hess test should control.
483. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320-21.
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(2) Likelihood of serious violence
As usual, the centerpiece of this clear and present danger
test is the likelihood requirement: respondent must prove that
the speech was likely to produce serious violence.484 In Ed-
wards v. South Carolina,485 for example, the Court reversed
the convictions of civil rights demonstrators because respon-
dent failed to prove that an outbreak of serious violence was
likely, especially in light of the large police presence at the
scene.
486
(3) Likelihood of imminent violence
Like the Brandenburg-Hess test, the Feiner clear and present
danger test requires respondent to prove that the threat of
audience violence was imminent.487 Although the Court's de-
cisions have not been explicit on the point, commentators have
contended that this test cannot be met if the police ,are in a
position to prevent the outbreak of violence by using standard
crowd control methods.488
c) 'Interference with judicial process
The clear and present danger test also applies when the
government tries to punish someone for speech (often newspa-
per reporting) that jeopardizes the orderly administration of
justice.489 The rule emerging from this line of cases is that
484. See supra note 465 and accompanying text.
485. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
486. Id. at 232-33 ("Police protection at the scene was at all times sufficient to
meet any foreseeable possibility of disorder.").
487. See supra note 460 and accompanying text.
488. E.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 854 (2d ed. 1988)
("[G]overnment authorities may not suppress otherwise protected speech if immi-
nent spectator violence can be satisfactorily prevented or curbed with reasonable
crowd control techniques."). These commentators usually rely on Justice Black's
dissent in Feiner, 340 U.S. at 326, which stated: "[Ilf, in the name of preserving
order, (the police] ever can interfere with a lawful public speaker, they first must
make all reasonable efforts to protect him."
489. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Wood v. Geor-
gia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). But see
Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991), holding that the clear and present
danger test does not apply to rules banning attorneys from commenting on
pending litigation in which they are involved.
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punishment is not allowed unless the publication produces a
clear and present danger of serious interference with the or-
derly administration of justice. As the Court put it in Wood v.
Georgia:490
In Bridges v. California, ... the Court held that out-of-court
publications were to be governed by the clear and present
danger standard, described as "a working principle that
the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can
be punished." '
In order to avoid excess repetition, the components of
this final version of the clear and present danger test will not
be spelled out separately. Suffice it to say that this version of
the test is more like Feiner than Brandenburg in that the stress
is on imminence, seriousness, and intent, and there is no re-
quirement that the publisher urge the reader to do anything.
2) Defamation
At one time, defamation was considered to be unprotect-
ed by the first amendment,49 and language still appears
from time to time in cases and commentaries suggesting that
defamation is outside the first amendment, at least if plaintiff
satisfies the requirements imposed by Supreme Court cas-
es. 493 The better view, however, is that the first amendment
does give some protection to defamation, but that defamation
awards are permissible if applicable first amendment tests,
such as the actual malice test, are met.49 4
The Supreme Court has developed a complex set of rules
for determining when defamation awards are consistent with
490. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
491. Id. at 383-84.
492. E.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libel is not "within
the area of constitutionally protected speech"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
493. E.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) ("Calculated falsehood
falls into that class of utterances ... [which are excluded under Chaplinsky].
Hence the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.").
494. The constitutionalization of defamation law began in the landmark case
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the Court stated:
"[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must
be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." Id. at 269.
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the first amendment. These rules are grounded in the com-
mon law, which defined defamation as publication of a false
statement of fact harmful to reputation. The Court has
constitutionalized much of the common law definition and
created additional rules designed to insure that the threat of
defamation awards does not unduly deter free speech. The
constitutional rules include some common ingredients and
some variable ingredients whose application depends on two
key factors: (1) whether the plaintiff is a public or private per-
son; and (2) whether the allegedly defamatory statement in-
volves a matter of public or private concern. This discussion
will focus first on the standard requirements and then on the
variable requirements.
a) Standard requirements
(1) False statement of fact
Defamation classically involves publication of a false state-
ment of fact harmful to reputation. The Court has
constitutionalized the requirement that an award of damages
for harm to reputation must be based on a false statement of
fact.495 As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it recently, the Court's
"cases provide protection for statements that cannot 'reason-
ably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individu-
al."496 Thus, for example, rhetorical hyperbole is not action-
able. 497  Similarly, a cartoon or satire containing
tongue-in-cheek fictitious "facts" about a person will not sup-
port a defamation award.49
495. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991); Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974). In Milkovich, the Court rejected the once-common notion that the first
amendment creates a privilege for "opinion," as opposed to "fact," but it con-
firmed the requirement that the defamatory utterance "contain a provably false
factual connotation," 110 S. Ct. at 2706, at least in public concern cases involving
media defendants.
496. Id. at 2706. In other words, to comprise defamation, statements must be
"provable as false." Id.
497. Id. at 2705.
498. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The case involved an
award of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than
defamation, but the Court's reasoning is based on rules derived from and applica-
ble in defamation cases.
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(2) Of and concerning plaintiff
Defamation also classically involves statements "of and
concerning" plaintiff, i.e., statements harmful to the plaintiffs
personal reputation. This common law requirement has been
constitutionalized in cases involving alleged defamation of
public officials.499 The Court's opinions make clear that gen-
eralized criticism of the government is not actionable.
00
(3) Harm to reputation
At common law, defamation was limited to false state-
ments subjecting an individual to "hatred, contempt, or ridi-
cule."' ' The Supreme Court has accepted this definition and
accordingly limits application of its defamation rules to cases
involving statements harmful to the reputation.0 2 Thus, cas-
es dealing with closely related issues such as true statements
which intrude into protected areas of personal privacy are not
included here and must be analyzed using other first amend-
ment theories. 50 When the statement is such that harm to
reputation is apparent, the rules described below apply. The
Court has reserved judgment on what rules apply when the
statement does not "make substantial danger to reputation
apparent. 
504
b) Variable requirements
Additional constitutional limits on defamation awards
reflect the interplay of two variables, whether the plaintiff is a
public or private person and whether the subject matter of the
utterance is of public or private concern. 0 5 These variables
499. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288 (1964).
500. E.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
501. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2702 (1990).
502. Id. at 2703.
503. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of privacy
cases.
504. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
505. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986):
One can discern in these decisions two forces that may reshape the
common-law landscape to conform to the First Amendment. The first
is whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure, or is instead a
private figure. The second is whether the speech at issue is of public
concern.
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give rise to four contexts which must be analyzed separately:
(1) public plaintiff/public concern, (2) public plaintiff/private
concern, (3) private plaintiff/public concern, and (4) private
plaintiff/private concern. °6  Later subsections discuss the
rules which apply in each of these four contexts, but in order
to determine which set of rules to apply it is first necessary to
examine the Supreme Court's rules for distinguishing public
and private plaintiffs and matters of public and private con-
cern.
(1) Public and private defamation defined
(a) Public or private plaintif/?
The first variable that affects the constitutional landscape
of defamation law is the status of the plaintiff, i.e., the person
defamed. When the person defamed is a "public official" or
"public figure," first amendment requirements are stricter than
when the defamation concerns a purely private person.
i. Public official
Plaintiff is a "public official," for purposes of defamation
law if he/she is a government official or employee, elected or
appointed, who has or appears to have substantial responsibili-
ty for setting or carrying out public policy. Candidates for such
positions are also deemed to be public officials in this context.
This broad definition, which is designed to permit robust criti-
cism of government affairs, obviously includes elected political
officials, °7 but it also includes less obvious government em-
Id.
506. The Court has sometimes suggested that a third variable may affect the
constitutional landscape in defamation cases, namely whether the suit is against a
media or nonmedia defendant. This distinction was rejected by six Justices in Dun
& Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), but it has been men-
tioned in more recent majority opinions. E.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 n.6 (1990) ("In Hepps the Court reserved judgment on cases
involving nonmedia defendants . . . and accordingly we do the same."). If the
Court reactivates the distinction, then the number of contexts requiring separate
analysis will jump from four to eight, and the constitutional law of defamation will
assume daunting complexity.
507. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (police com-
missioner).
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ployees such as teachers and supervisors of a county-owned ski
resort.5 o8
ii. Public figure
In contrast to its broad definition of "public official," the
Court has defined "public figure" narrowly. Plaintiffs are "pub-
lic figures," for purposes of defamation law, only if they have
achieved general notoriety or voluntarily thrust themselves into
the public spotlight in order to influence the specific event
that is the subject matter of the allegedly defamatory state-
ment.0 9 "General notoriety" has not been specifically de-
fined, but presumably it requires broad-based name recogni-
tion such as that achieved by Jerry Falwell, founder of the Mor-
al Majority. 510 The Court has been quite strict in applying
the "voluntarily thrust into public spotlight" test. For example,
the Court held that prominent socialite Mary Alice Firestone
was not a public figure despite the fact that she had held press
conferences regarding her divorce, the subject matter of the
allegedly defamatory statement.511
(b) Public or private concern?
In cases involving public officials, statements "relating to
official conduct" are matters of public concern. This is defined
broadly to include any statement concerning the official's per-
formance or fitness to perform official duties.512 Otherwise,
the test for determining whether the subject matter of the
allegedly defamatory statement is of public or private concern
requires the court to focus on the content, form, and context
of the statement.515 This is a regrettably vague test, one that
will likely produce substantial problems in future cases.
508. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
509. E.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
510. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that Jerry Falwell
is a public figure).
511. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 448.
512. E.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
513. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (holding a
statement that Greenmoss was bankrupt was not of public concern).
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(2) Rules governing public and private
defamation
The next four subsections discuss the constitutional rules
that apply to defamation actions involving public and private
plaintiffs and matters of public and private concern. The cru-
cial variables are (1) the degree of fault that must be proved to
recover compensatory and punitive damages and (2) the alloca-
tion and weight of the burdens of proof. In general, the rules
are stricter for cases involving public plaintiffs and/or con-
cerns than for cases involving private plaintiffs and/or con-
cerns.
(a) Public plaintiff/public
concern
514
First amendment requirements are strictest when the
plaintiff is a public official or public figure and the allegedly
defamatory statement relates to an issue of public concern."' 5
The strict requirements are designed to prevent the threat of
defamation suits from deterring criticism of public officials
and candidates for public office. The requirements reflect the
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials." 516 In this context, the Court has imposed several im-
portant constitutional limits, including a requirement of "actu-
al malice" and a requirement that plaintiff prove fault and
falsity by clear and convincing evidence.
514. The leading case in this category is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
515. Philadelphia Newspapers Co. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). "When
the speech is of public concern and the plaintiff is a public official or public
figure, the Constitution clearly requires the plaintiff to surmount a much higher
barrier before recovering damages . . . than is raised by the common law." Id.
516. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
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i. Actual malice
Public plaintiffs may not recover defamation awards for
statements on matters of public concern unless they prove that
the statement was made with "actual malice," i.e., with "knowl-
edge that it [the statement] was false" or "reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."""7 This is a subjective test that
focuses on defendant's mental state.5 18 Moreover, the test is
quite strict, requiring that defendant had actual serious doubts
about the truth of the statement.510 In public plaintiff/public
concern cases, plaintiff must prove actual malice to recover
presumed and punitive damages 520 and compensatory dam-
ages as well.
Obviously, actual malice will be difficult to prove in most
cases, but the Court has held that plaintiff is entitled to wide-
ranging discovery on the issue, including deposition testimony
regarding defendant's state of mind when writing or uttering
the statement.52' Appellate courts are required to conduct an
independent review of the evidence and make their own deter-
mination whether plaintiff proved actual malice.522
ii. Clear and convincing evidence
The Constitution imposes on plaintiff the burden to prove
fault (actual malice) by clear and convincing evidence. 523 This
is stricter than the burden of proof by a "preponderance of
517. Id. at 280. The definition of actual malice does not correspond to the
usual connotation of "malice," i.e., ill will or spite. Harte-Hanks Communications v.
Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 n. 7 (1989) ("The phrase 'actual malice' is
unfortunately confusing in thar it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will.").
518. Haile-Hanks Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2696 ("The standard is a subjec-
tive one .... "). The fact that a reasonable person would have known the state-
ment was false or had serious doubts about the statement's accuracy is not con-
trolling. In other words, objective negligence is not sufficient; subjective reckless-
ness is required.
519. E.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) ("serious doubts
as to the truth"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("high degree of
awareness of . . . probable falsity.").
520. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
521. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
522. E.g., Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2681
(1989); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984).
523. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
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the evidence" usually applicable in civil cases at common law,
but it is not as strict as the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard applicable to the prosecution's case in criminal courts.
The Constitution also gives plaintiff the burden of proof on
the issue of falsity.524 The judge should grant summary judg-
ment before trial unless plaintiff proffers clear and convincing
evidence of actual malice, 2 5 and appellate courts should "ex-
ercise independent judgment and determine whether the re-
cord establishes actual malice with convincing clarity."5 26
(b) Public plaintiff/private concern
Surprisingly, the Court has not specified the tests applica-
ble to actions brought by public officials and public figures
based on defamatory statements on matters solely of private
concern. Presumably the rules must be at least as strict as
those applicable in private plaintiff/private concern cases.52 7
Common law rules may be constitutionally permissible on
some issues, but the Court may impose stricter constitutional
requirements. It is unknown, for example, whether presumed
and punitive damages will be permitted without proof of actual
malice. 21 In any case, the rules will not be as strict as in pub-
lic plaintiff/public concern cases.52 9
524. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). "We believe that
the common law's rule on falsity-that the defendant must bear the burden of
proving truth-must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the
plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering
damages." Id. at 776. The Hepps opinion is equivocal regarding whether the clear
and convincing evidence standard applies to the issue of falsity.
525. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
526. Haile-Hanks Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2681 (quoting Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984)).
527. See infra notes 537-39 and accompanying text.
528. See infra note 539 and accompanying text.
529. The Court will probably use definitional balancing to resolve these issues.
See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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(c) Private plaintiff/public con-
cern
530
"When the speech is of public concern but the plaintiff is
a private figure,... the Constitution still supplants the stan-
dards of the common law, but the constitutional requirements
are, in at least some of their range, less forbidding than when
the plaintiff is a public figure and the speech is of public con-
cern."31 Once again, the key variables concern the degree of
fault and the allocation and weight of the burdens of proof.
i. Degree offault
The first amendment bans States from imposing strict
liability, i.e., liability without fault, in defamation cases involv-
ing matters of public concern." 2 Therefore, in private plain-
tiff/public concern cases, plaintiffs must prove that defendant
was at least negligent regarding falsity. But plaintiff need not
prove actual malice in order to recover compensatory damag-
es, including compensation for humiliation and suffering.
33
On the other hand, the Constitution requires that plaintiffs in
such cases prove actual malice in order to recover presumed
or punitive damages.
34
ii. Burdens of proof
The first amendment requires, in cases involving matters
of public concern, that private plaintiffs bear the burden of
530. The seminal case in this category is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974). Another leading case is Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 476 U.S.
767 (1986).
531. Hepps, 476 U.S. at 775.
532. E.g., Getiz, 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974).
533. Id. at 350. Gertz overruled an earlier case, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
403 U.S. 29 (1971), which held that private plaintiffs must prove actual malice to
recover compensatory damages where the allegedly defamatory statement is of
public concern. Applying definitional balancing, the Gertz Court rejected the actual
malice test for compensatory damages, reasoning that private plaintiffs' interest in
their reputations is greater because they have not voluntarily exposed their reputa-
tions to public attack and, having less access to the mass media for replies, they
are more vulnerable to defamation.
534. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. See supra notes 517-22 for an explanation of what
must be proved to satisfy the actual malice test.
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proof on both falsity53 5 and fault.536 The Court has not yet
decided whether the common law preponderance of the evi-
dence test may be used or whether the first amendment re-
quires that plaintiff prove these elements by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
(d) Private plaintiff/private con-
cern
537
"When the speech is of exclusively private concern and
the plaintiff is a private figure, . . . the constitutional require-
ments do not necessarily force any change in at least some of
the features of the common-law landscape." 38 Thus, for ex-
ample, presumed and punitive damages are permitted in pri-
vate plaintiff/private concern cases without proof of actual
malice.53 9 It appears to follow a fortiori that proof of actual
malice is not required to recover compensatory damages in
such cases. The Court has not yet resolved the other standard
issues concerning whether the State may impose liability with-
out fault and whether the first amendment imposes any re-
quirements regarding allocation and/or weight of the burdens
of proof on fault and falsity.
3) Regulation of speech by government employees
When the infringement of free speech involves the dis-
charge of a government employee, the Court uses a two-part
test that focuses on (1) whether the discharge was for speech
on a matter of public concern and (2) whether the government
interest in discharging the employee outweighed the first
amendment interest in free speech. This is referred to as the
Connick-Rankin test.54
0
535. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
536. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 ("[slo long as they do not impose liability without
fault . . ").
537. The leading case in this category is Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
538. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775.
539. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
540. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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a) Matter of public concern
Part one requires the court to determine whether the
speech "may be 'fairly characterized as constituting speech on
a matter of public concern.'"541 As in defamation cases, the
test for "matter of public concern" focuses on "the content,
form, and context of a given statement."542
If the speech is not about a matter of public concern, the
court's review should be very deferential.54 If the speech is
about a matter of public concern, the second part of the
Connick-Rankin test applies.,
b) Balancing test
Part two requires the court to balance the employee's free
speech interest against the government's interest in promoting
the efficiency of services performed by its employees. 44 The
employer has the "burden of justifying the discharge on legiti-
mate grounds,"545 and the court must make an independent
judgment rather than deferring to the employer.5 46
Thus, the Court overturned the discharge of a clerical
employee in a constable's office for saying, after the 1981 at-
tempt to assassinate President Reagan, "If they go for him
541. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146).
542. "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record." Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, quoted with approval in
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384-85.
543. "Even where a public employee's speech does not touch upon a matter of
public concern, that speech is not 'totally beyond the protection of the First
Amendment,' . . . but 'absent the most unusual circumstances a federal court is
not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision
taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.'"
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 n. 7 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
544. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (quoting Pickering 391 U.S. at 568).
The determination whether a public employer has properly discharged
an employee for engaging in speech requires "a balance between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."
Id.
545. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
546. Id. at 385-86.
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again, I hope they get him."547 The Court reasoned that the
statement was about a matter of public concern and that
"[g]iven the function of the agency, McPherson's position in
the office, and the nature of her statement, we are not per-
suaded that Rankin's interest in discharging her outweighed
her rights under the First Amendment. '
This ends the discussion of the tests the Supreme Court
has developed for determining whether infringements of pro-
tected speech violate the first amendment and, more generally,
the discussion of the merits of first amendment claims. If re-
spondent either did not infringe claimant's protected commu-
nicative interest or satisfied the tests developed by the
Supreme Court for enforcing free speech, claimant loses on
the merits, and the analysis ends. If, on the other hand, the
preliminary requirements are met and claimant prevails on the
merits by proving that respondent infringed his/her free
speech and did not comply with the first amendment's require-
ments, claimant wins on the merits, and the final issue is what
remedies are in order.
C. Remedies
A detailed discussion of remedies for violations of free
speech is beyond the scope of this article. A few comments,
however, are in order.
The most important distinction that affects remedies in
free speech cases is between as-applied challenges and facial
"substantial overbreadth" challenges.5 49 As a general rule,
claimant challenges government action as applied. If claimant
wins, respondent's specific conduct is held unconstitutional,
but the underlying law remains in effect and may be applied to
other cases. In other words, if claimant's conduct is protected
by the first amendment, the statute should "be declared invalid
547. Id. at 381.
548. Id. at 392.
549. The landmark case on the substantial overbreadth doctrine is Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). At one time, it appeared that the Broadiick
substantial overbreadth test applied only to governmental regulation of conduct,
but later cases held that the doctrine applies to regulation of pure speech as well.
E.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 503 n.12 (1985); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982). See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine as an exception to the general rule
against third-party standing.
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to the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left in-
tact."5 5 However, if a claimant whose conduct is not protect-
ed by the first amendment challenges the government action
on its face for overbreadth and wins, the entire statute is
struck down and may not be applied to anyone until it is re-
drafted to eliminate the overbreadth.55 1 In cases involving
both facial and as-applied challenges, courts should normally
decide the as-applied challenge before deciding the facial chal-
lenge.552
Finally, the harmless error rule applies in free speech cas-
es. Thus, if criminal sanctions are imposed on claimant in vio-
lation of the first amendment, the conviction need not be re-
versed if the 'error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.5
53
III. CONCLUSION
Basic free speech analysis proceeds in three steps. First,
the preliminary requirements (jurisdiction, justiciability, and
government action) must be met. Second, the merits of the
claim must be considered. One must determine whether the
first amendment is applicable, i.e., whether respondent in-
fringed a communicative interest protected by the first amend-
ment. If so, one must determine whether respondent complied
with the requirements of the first amendment, i.e., whether
respondent can satisfy the rules the Supreme Court has devel-
oped for enforcing free speech. If respondent infringed
claimant's free speech and did not comply with the first
amendment's requirements, claimant wins on the merits, and
questions concerning remedies must be addressed. Hopefully,
this analytical model will help law students, lawyers, and judges
550. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504.
551. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482-86 (1989), for a general
discussion of these points.
552. Fox, 492 U.S. at 484-85:
It is not the usual judicial practice, however, nor do we consider it
generally desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessari-
ly-that is, before it is determined that the statute would be valid as
applied .... [T]he lawfulness of the particular application of the law
should ordinarily be decided first.
Id.
553. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
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conduct free speech analyses in an orderly and accurate fash-
ion.
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APPENDIX
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is possible to
set forth the following, more detailed outline of basis free
speech analysis.
Free Speech: Basic Analysis
I. Have the preliminary requirements been met?
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits: Did respondent violate claimant's free
speech rights?
A. Applicability: Did respondent infringe claimant's
protected free speech interests?
1. Protected interest?
a. General rule: communications are protected by
the first amendment.
b. Exceptions: communications not protected by
the first amendment include
1) Criminal speech
2) Fighting words
a) Face-to-face communication to
individual
b) Reasonable person would have known
c) Likely to incite immediate breach of
peace
d) By average addressee (with known traits
of actual addressee)
3) Obscenity
a) Is the material obscene?
(1) Appeal to prurient interest
(a) Material as a whole
(b) Appeals to prurient (shameful
or morbid) interest in sex
(c) Of average person
(contemporary community
standards)
(2) Patent offensiveness
(a) Depiction of description of
hard core sex acts, such as
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ultimate sex acts, masturbation,
etc.
(b) Covered sex acts specifically
defined by law
(c) Patently offensive to average
person (contemporary
community standards) and
(3) No serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value
(a) Reasonable person would
conclude
(b) Material as a whole
(c) Lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value
b) Other requirements
(1) Scienter
(2) Freedman standards for licensing
systems
(a) Respondent has burden of
proof
(b) Judicial determination required
(c) Prompt decision required
4) Child pornography
a) Visual depiction of child sex
b) Prohibited conduct and age of child
adequately defined and
c) Scienter required
5) Misleading or "illegal" commercial speech
a) Commercial speech
b) Misleading or solely concerned with
illegal activity
6) Method for determining whether new
exceptions should be created (definitional
balancing)
2. Infringement: did respondent substantially
interfere with claimant's free speech?
B. Compliance: Can respondent satisfy the Supreme
Court's rules for enforcing free speech?
1. Infringements subject to means-end scrutiny
a. Infringements subject to strict scrutiny
1) Content-based infringements
a) Is the infringement content-based?
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b) Is strict scrutiny satisfied?
(1) Does respondent's conduct further
a compelling interest?
(a) Compelling interest
i. Actual interest
ii. Permissible interest
iii. Very strong interest
(b) Substantially effective means
and
(2) Are the means necessary (the least
restrictive alternative)?
c) Application of strict scrutiny in specific
contexts
(1) Offensive speech
(2) Campaign contributions and
expenditures
(3) Invasions of privacy
(4) Charitable solicitation
d) Exceptions to the general rule that
content-based infringements are subject
to strict scrutiny
2) Infringements of freedom of association
a) Infringement of protected interest
(1) Protected interest
(a) Expressive association
(b) Private association
(2) Infringement
b) Is strict scrutiny satisfied?
3) Prior restraints
a) Is the infringement a prior restraint?
b) Compliance
(1) Is strict scrutiny satisfied?
(2) Compliance with special rules for
licensing systems
(a) Clear guidelines limiting
discretion
(b) Compliance with Freedman
standards
i. Burden of proof on
licensor
ii. Judicial determination
required
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iii. Prompt decision required
b. Infringements subject to mid-level means-end
scrutiny
1) Time, place, and manner regulations
a) Content-neutrality
b) Narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest
(1) Significant government interest
(2) Narrowly tailored means
(a) Effective means
(b) No substantially less restrictive
alternatives
c) Ample alternative channels
2) Regulations of speech plus conduct,
including symbolic speech
a) Regulations of symbolic speech
(1) Is the conduct symbolic speech?
(a) Intent to communicate
particularized message
(b) Likelihood that audience would
understand message
(2) Compliance with O'Brien four-part
test
(a) Within government's power
(b) Furthers a substantial
government interest
i. Substantial government
interest
ii. Effective means
(c) Interest unrelated to
suppressing expression
(d) Restriction not substantially
greater than essential
b) Other speech-plus cases (O'Brien test)
3) Commercial speech
a) Is the speech commercial speech?
b) Compliance with Central Hudson test
(1) Not misleading or solely
concerned with illegal activity
(2) Substantial government interest
(3) Means that directly advance interest
1991]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
(4) Restriction not substantially more
extensive than necessary
4) Communication-restricting regulations of
electronic media
a) Type of regulation
(1) Regulation of electronic
broadcasting
(2) Communication-restricting
b) Narrowly tailored to further substantial
government interest
(1) Substantial government interest
(2) Narrowly tailored means
(a) Effective means
(b) Means not substantially more
burden-some than necessary
5) Regulations of prisoners' outgoing
communications
a) Type of regulation
(1) Prison context
(2) Outgoing communications
b) Mid-level scrutiny
(1) Further a substantial government
interest
(a) Substantial government interest
(b) Effective means
(2) Restriction not substantially greater
than necessary
c. Infringements subject to rationality review
1) Nonpublic forums
a) Is the property a government-owned or
controlled nonpublic forum?
(1) Property owned or controlled by
government
(2) Nonpublic forum
b) Compliance with tests
(1) Point-of-view neutral
(2) Rational
(a) Conceivable valid government
interest
(b) Arguably effective means
2) Regulation of communications to prisoners
a) Type of regulation
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(1) Prison context
(2) Incoming communications
b) Specialized rationality review
(1) Legitimate and neutral government
interest
(2) Alternative means remain open
(3) Impact on rights of others
(4) Any alternative with de minimis cost
3) Disfavored speech
a) American Mini Theatres doctrine
(1) Disfavored speech (adult movies)
(2) Slight infringement
(3) Significant independent
government interest
(4) Rational
b) Pacifica doctrine
(1) Disfavored speech (massed sexual
and excretory language)
(2) Electronic broadcasting
(3) Slight infringement
(4) Rational
4) Communication-enhancing regulations of
electronic media
a) Type of regulation
(1) Regulation of electronic
broadcasting
(2) Communication-enhancing
b) Rational
2. Infringements subject to tests other than
means-end scrutiny
a. Speech subject to incitement/clear and present
danger tests
1) Incitement of illegal acts
a) Brandenberg-Hess test
(1) Incitement of acts
(2) Incitement of imminent acts
(3) Likelihood of imminent harm
(4) Likelihood of serious harm
(5) Intent to incite imminent, illegal
acts
b) Dennis-Yates test
(1) Incitement of acts
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(2) Threat of serious harm
(3) Intent to incite illegal acts'
(4) Gravity of evil discounted by
improbability justifies infringement
of speech
2) Incitement of hostile audience
a) Intent to cause violent response
b) Likelihood of serious violence
c) Likelihood of imminent violence
3) Interference with the judicial process
b. Defamation
1) Standard requirements
a) False statement of fact
b) Of and concerning plaintiff
c) Harmful to reputation
2) Variable requirements
a) Public plaintiff/public concern
(1) Fault: actual malice required
(2) Burdens of proof: plaintiff must
prove actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence and must also
prove falsity
b) Public plaintiff/private concern
(unsettled)
c) Private plaintiff/public concern
(1) Fault
(a) No strict liability
(b) Actual malice required for
presumed and punitive
damages
(2) Burdens of proof: plaintiff must
prove fault and falsity
d) Private plaintiff/private concern
(1) Fault
(a) Actual malice not required
(b) Unsettled whether negligence is
required
(2) Burdens of proof: plaintiff must
prove falsity
c. Speech by government employees
1) Punishment of government employee for
speech?
[Vol. 31
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2) Connick-Rankin two-part test
a) Speech about matter of public concern
b) Balancing test: does government
interest outweigh free speech interest?
III. Remedies

